

5. Qājār Khurāsān

THE SETTING IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

No matter how varied the perspective, nineteenth-century perceptions of Khurāsān bear remarkable similarities with one another, both in a geographical and political sense. Iranian chroniclers as well as British travelers noted that unrest seemed to be a natural state of affairs in the region, and that the stubbornness of the inhabitants was matched by the inaccessibility of their tribal domains. In the 1850s, Riżā Qulī Khān Hidāyat compared Khurāsān to “a sea bringing forth storms...It is [like] an ocean ruffled by waves. Once it is aroused, wave after wave will arise, for this is the abode and dwelling place of various tribes (*tavāyif*), each of which by habit carry their head high in pride and refractoriness.”¹ This assessment is shared by the British secretary Eastwick who observed in 1862 that “[t]he normal state of Khurāsān is war. Petty plunderings, murders, brigandage, small insurrections, executions of five, ten, or twenty robbers take place weekly; and cavalry engagements, sieges of fortresses or towns, annually, with a considerable war every five or ten years.”²

In the early 1820s, the British traveller James Fraser described Khurāsān as a dangerous place. While the region officially formed part of the Qājār Empire, the provincial governors found their sphere of influence restricted to the immediate surroundings of Mashhad, Nīshāpūr, Sabzavār, and Turshīz.³ In the late 18th century, the political vacuum created by the crumbling of Sadūzai power and the relative weakness of the Afsharid rulers of Mashhad allowed a number of local lords to carve out their own realms. Foremost among these was the Turkic Qarā’ī leadership of Turbat-i Haidarīya (later also known as Turbat-i Ishāq Khān), a well cultivated district south of Mashhad, which British observers described as “one of the most prosperous towns” of Khurāsān.⁴ Further south, the Arab leadership of Qāyin and Bīrjand maintained a precarious independence between the representatives of royal authority based in Mashhad and Kirmān.⁵ In the southwest, the Zangū’ī Arab governors of Tūn (present-day Firdaus) and Ṭabas (also known as Gulshan) consistently cooperated with the Qājār governors of Mashhad.⁶ The trade route between Mashhad and Herat was controlled by Tīmūrī and Hazāra chiefs. Qilich Khān, the powerful chief Tīmūrī chief of Khvāf, enjoyed a great measure of influence at the provincial court in Mashhad.⁷

Northwest of Mashhad, the regions of Khabūshān (Qūchān) and Bujnūrd had been a Kurdish domain since Safavid times.⁸ Although locked into a system of mutual raids with the neighboring Turkmens, the Kurdish leadership had developed a *modus vivendi* with these groups, using the threat their neighbors represented as a bargaining chip in their relationship with the Qājār court. Thus Fraser noted that

[t]he Toorkomans, who have more than once been oppressed by Mahomed Raheem [Muḥammad Raḥīm] Khan of Khaurezm [Khvārazm], have of late shown a disposition to shelter themselves from the power of that monarch, by a union with the chiefs of Koordistan [Kurdistān]; and these chiefs have found that such an union operates powerfully in checking the disposition of the king to annoy them with demands for tribute; for his majesty, whose arms are neither very efficient nor dreaded, will rather come to easy terms than drive to desperation men who have the means of letting loose upon his dominions the armed plunderers of the desert. The king, indeed, views this good understanding with a jealous eye, but so weak is his influence in this quarter, that whatever he attempts by arms or negotiation, is baffled, more by the intrigues of his servants than his avowed enemies; for the former find it their interest to keep up, and play one party against another, thus creating difficulties, and enhancing the value of

¹ TRSN X: 535.

² Eastwick 1976 II: 216.

³ Fraser 1825: 326–7; “Route from Meshed to Cabul by Herat and Candahar” (1830), IOL, L/PS/19/59.

⁴ “Route from Meshed to Cabul by Herat and Candahar” (1830), IOL, L/PS/19/59. See also Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 25; Mīr Niya 1990: 77.

⁵ Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 20.

⁶ *Dhū al-qarnain* 430; NT 283, 306, 316–17, 414, 459.

⁷ Fraser 1825: 488, 524, 528; *Gaz. Iran* II: 115, 242, 309.

⁸ Afshār 1999: 205–6; Barthold 1984: 91.

their own services, so that under existing circumstances it might be the king's best policy to permit unopposed the independence of these border chiefs, to preserve the peace of the country.⁹

The most influential Kurdish leader, Īlkhānī Rizā Qulī Khān Za'farānlū, controlled the local towns of Khabūshān, Shīrvān and Chinārān and had sufficient resources at his disposal to maintain a standing force of 1,200 men.¹⁰ He was linked by marriage alliance to Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū,¹¹ who resided in the town of Bujnūrd and had 500–600 cavalry at his disposal.¹² To the northeast, the region of Darra Gaz, with the towns of Muḥammadābād and Luṭfābād, was held by Chāpushlū leaders of Turkic origin.¹³ Commanding 600–700 horsemen, Bēgler Khān Chāpushlū was allied to the Kurdish leadership of Khabūshān and Bujnūrd in their resistance to the Qājār governor Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā from 1813 on. In the 1830s, his son Rizā Qulī Khān Chāpushlū established a close linkage with the Qājār heir-apparent 'Abbās Mīrzā Nā'ib al-Salṭana and received the title of “‘Abbās Qulī Khān”.¹⁴

All early nineteenth-century authors make a point of mentioning the continuing strength of the Khurāsānī leadership. In the following, I will explore the tribal makeup of the region as reflected by Persian and European accounts. The second part of this chapter will focus on the Qājār mode of government, the interaction with the tribal nobility of the region, and the endeavor to regain control of Herat. For the greater part of the nineteenth century, there is a discernable gap between extensive Qājār claims to power and the narrow political exigencies the governors of Mashhad were grappling with. The final section will be devoted to the conceptual tension generated by this state of affairs and its reflection in the contemporaneous Persian historiography.

THE TRIBAL FRAMEWORK

In the 1820s, Zain al-‘Ābidīn Shīrvānī observed that the most definitive feature of Khurāsān province lay in its tribal population, which he estimated to consist of 40,000 Qizilbāsh families, 50,000 Kurdish families, and 60,000 Arab families. In Shīrvānī's opinion, the local Arabs had entered the region during the Umayyad and Abbasid era.¹⁵ Indeed, the migration of some of the prominent Arab groups to Khurāsān can be traced to the early Muslim period. The Khuzaima Arabs living in the region of Qāyin reputedly settled there during the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809).¹⁶ The Zangū'ī Arabs of Tūn and Ṭabas, by contrast, were said to have been brought from Arabia to Iran as late as the Safavid period.¹⁷ The origin of the Mīshmast Arabs of Turshīz and Turbat-i Shaikh Jām is not accounted for in terms of legend or historical fact.¹⁸

The other two groups mentioned by Shīrvānī, the Qizilbāsh and Kurds, owed their settlement in Khurāsān in large part to what Perry has described as an early seventeenth-century strategy combining scorched earth tactics in Azerbaijan with the “cossackization” of the northeastern frontier.¹⁹ According to the standard accounts, Shāh 'Abbās I divided the Qājārs into three branches and settled them in Ganja, Marv, and

⁹ Fraser 1825: Appendix B, 51–2.

¹⁰ NT 480; Fraser 1825: 259, Appendix B: 42–52. According to Curzon, the local cavalry contingent originally numbered 1,000 men and was reduced to 500 by the 1890s (Curzon 1966 I: 111).

¹¹ The name of this Shādillū leader is variously given as Najaf Qulī Khān or Najaf 'Alī Khān in the available Persian texts.

¹² Fraser Appendix B: 52–3; Gaz Iran II: 81–5, 95; NT 415, 480, 482. For a detailed description of the villages and town making up the realm of the Shādillū leaders, see MSh I: 127–38.

¹³ Ruling over a mixed population of Afshārs, Girāylīs and Kurds, the leading family of Darra Gaz were of Turkic origin. Their ancestor Muḥammad Bābā Chāpushlū (d. 1737) had migrated from Qarshī prior to the rise of Nādir Shāh and received lands in Darra Gaz from the governor of Abīvard (Fraser 1825: 523, App. B: 53; Fraser 1973: 287–9; *Gaz. Iran* II: 137–41. See also O'Donovan 1970 II: 30, 55–6).

¹⁴ *Dhū al-qarnain* 906.

¹⁵ *Riyāz al-siyāhat* 143.

¹⁶ C. E. Yate 1900: 65. The purported Arab connection is denied by the representatives of the Khuzaima family, who assert their Khurasanian origin. For a detailed discussion of the early history of the Khuzaima Arabs, see Mojtabeh-Zadeh 2004: 42–7.

¹⁷ C. E. Yate 1900: 59.

¹⁸ Mīr Niyā 1990: 155, 161–2; Oberling, “‘Arab, iv. Arab Tribes of Iran,” *E.Ir.* II: 217.

¹⁹ Perry 1975.

Astarābād.²⁰ While the first two branches declined in the course of the eighteenth century, the Qājārs of Astarābād benefited from their relatively isolated position between the Qara Qum desert, the swamps and forests of Māzandarān, and the northern Alburz range, eventually giving rise to the Qājār dynasty.²¹

The origin of the Kurds in northern Khurāsān is generally attributed to Shāh ‘Abbās I’s removal of at least 30,000 families from the region near Erzerum to Khabūshān. Given their great number, this group soon assumed an influential position in the politics of Khurāsān. At the time of Nādir Shāh’s rise to power, they were locked into bitter rivalry both with the Qājār leadership of Astarābād and with Nādir Shāh himself.²² Nādir Shāh belonged to the Qirqlū subdivision of the Afshār Turkmens, who had been transferred by Shāh ‘Abbās I from the Urmīya region to Abīvard and Darra Gaz. Another group to settle in Khurāsān in the early seventeenth century were the Bayāts, who were moved from Yerevan to Nīshāpūr.²³

Nādir Shāh likewise employed the instrument of large-scale resettlement to populate and strengthen his basis in Khurāsān. After his campaign to Azerbaijan in 1730, he transferred 12,000 Afshār families to Khurāsān.²⁴ By the end of 1730, a total of 50–60,000 families had been transplanted from Azerbaijan, Persian ‘Irāq and Fārs to Khurāsān.²⁵ Between 1732 and 1736, a total of 13,000 Bakhtiyārīs were sent to Khurāsān.²⁶ Yet a great part of Nādir Shāh’s measures was reversed with his death in 1747, as the Zand, Bakhtiyārīs, Shāhseven, and Shaqāqī Kurds he had brought in gravitated west, to the realm of Karīm Khān Zand (r. 1751–1779).²⁷ The major branches of the Abdālī (later Durrānī) tribes, which Nādir Shāh had removed from Herat in 1732, already received lands around Qandahār during his lifetime.²⁸ Other groups transplanted by Nādir Shāh, for instance, one thousand Arab families in Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya and a group of Arabs who were transferred from Khūzistān to the region of Bīrjand, stayed on after his death.²⁹

Nādir Shāh’s sweeping measures notwithstanding, a report compiled in 1215/1800–01 indicates that the geographical distribution of the tribes in Khurāsān did not change significantly after the late Safavid period. Detailing the troops and revenues at the disposal of the Safavid ruler Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusain (r. 1694–1722) and Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh Qājār (r. 1797–1834), this report is of little reliability as far as the numerical strength of the individual tribes is concerned, but its description of the circumstances in the early eighteenth century closely approximates the demographic composition of Khurāsān known in the nineteenth century.³⁰ Among the groups of Iranian origin, it lists the Za‘farānlū Kurds of Chinārān, the Sa‘dānlū Kurds of Khabūshān, as well

²⁰ Avery 1991: 4–5; Hambly 1991a: 106–7; Lambton, “Īlāt,” *E.I.*, 2 III: 1101–2; There is evidence that the relocation of the Qājārs and Kurds to Khurāsān was more gradual a process than the official narrative suggests, and that it did not entirely coincide with the forced removals officially initiated by Shāh ‘Abbās I (Perry 1975: 204–9).

²¹ Hambly 1991a: 106–7.

²² Avery 1991: 4–5; Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 327–8. According to Yate, Shāh Qulī Sulṭān Za‘farānlū, the ancestor of the *īlkhānīs* of Khabūshān, received the title of *amīr al-umarā* from Shāh ‘Abbās I and was resettled in Akhal. He was accompanied by 40,000 Kurdish families comprising the Za‘farānlū, Shādillū, Kaivānlū, Amarlū and Qarāchūrlū subdivisions. During the reign of Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusain (r. 1694–1722), ongoing raids emanating from Ūrganj and Bukhārā forced the Kurds to withdraw into the mountains to the south. After displacing the local Girāyli population, they settled in the region of Khabūshān, Shīrvān, Bujnūrd, and Simalqān (C. E. Yate 1900: 180–1).

²³ Avery 1991: 4–5; Perry 1975: 205; Perry, “Nādir Shāh Afshār,” *E.I.*, 2 VII: 853–6. According to Minorsky, some Afshārs were already resettled in the region of Abīvard by Shāh Ismā‘īl I (Minorsky 1934: 3). Doerfer is of the opinion that the Qarā Bayāts already lived around Nīshāpūr at the time of Shāh Ismā‘īl I’s conquest of Khurāsān (Dorfer, “Bayāt,” *E.Ir.* III: 883).

²⁴ Among these Afshārs were 2,000 Qirqlū families who were settled in Kubkan (?) located southeast of Darra Gaz. The remaining Afshārs were sent to Kalāt-i Nādirī (Lockhart 1938: 51–2).

²⁵ Minorsky 1934: 9.

²⁶ 3,000 families of the Haft Lang Bakhtiyārīs were moved to Khurāsān in 1732. A second group of 10,000 families of Haft Lang and Chahār Lang Bakhtiyārīs were relocated after the suppression of a Bakhtiyārī rebellion in 1736 (Lockhart 1938: 51–2, 54, 65, 110).

²⁷ TA (Humāyūn) 16; see also Mann 1898: 174.

²⁸ Lockhart 1938: 54.

²⁹ Oberling, “Arab, iv. Arab Tribes of Iran,” *E.Ir.* II: 217.

³⁰ Dānishpazhūh 1974. See also Towfiq, “‘Asāyer,” *E.Ir.* II: 709; Lambton, “Īlāt,” *E.I.*, 2 III: 1101–2. The anonymous author bases his account of the Safavid period on a statement by Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥusain Mustaufī al-Mamālik in 1128/1715–16.

as the Kavānlū Kurds of Rādkān.³¹ Two further groups of Iranian origin inhabiting Khurāsān are mentioned: the Jalāyirs migrating between Kalāt and Marv, and the Qarā'īs based in the region between Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya and Turbat-i Shaikh Jām.³² The Turkish tribe of the Afshārs, comprising the Shāmlū, Qirqlū (Qirkhlū) and Sarvānlū subdivisions, is placed in the region around Tūs.³³ The Qājārs are reported to live in Astarābād, Yerevan and Marv.³⁴ Among the Arab groups mentioned are the Mīshmast located in the Turshīz and Qāyīnāt districts, and the Zangū'īs located in Ṭabas.³⁵

Estimates concerning the percentage of the tribal population in Iran varied over time and according to the viewpoint of different observers. Writing in the early nineteenth century, Kinneir was of the opinion that the *ilāt*, or wandering tribes, outnumbered the town population.³⁶ In the 1850s, Lady Sheil described Persia as “overrun with tribes” and reckoned that the combined number of the “wandering and stationary clans” made up at least half of the total population.³⁷ As Lady Sheil's statement suggests, a number of tribes were sedentary. Even so, the term *il* and its synonyms (*‘ashīra*, *qabīla*, *ṭāyifa*) were primarily associated with nomadism and implied an opposition to the settled, urban life representing the sphere of government. This contrast between two seemingly irreconcilable modes of life was blurred by the tribal origins of the ruling Qājār dynasty, who followed a long established Iranian tradition of nomads-turned-rulers. While making Tehran their capital (*dār al-khilāfa*),³⁸ the Qājār rulers continued to celebrate their nomadic background by maintaining a pattern of movement reminiscent of the early modern tribal mode of government. In the early nineteenth century, Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh, like most members of his lineage, was reported to prefer “an erratck to a settled life; a village to a city, and a tent to a palace.”³⁹ Labeled as a pastime, the movement to hunting grounds and summer camps coincided with military activity. Pilgrimages to holy sites may likewise be understood as byproduct of the need to enforce local authority. Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh's pilgrimage to the shrine of Imām Rizā in 1818 signaled the successful conclusion of a military campaign against the chiefs of Khurāsān and the neighboring Turkmens.⁴⁰ Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's (r. 1834–1848) visit to the province in 1836, as well as Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's (r. 1848–1896) trips there in 1867 and 1883 fulfilled a similar purpose, combining ostentatious acts of patronage with a show of force.⁴¹

³¹ Dānishpazhūh 1974: 410–11.

³² Dānishpazhūh 1974: 411–12. According to Yate, the Qarā'īs were of Turk origin and were taken to Syria by one of the Mongol kings. Tīmūr Lang (r. 1370–1405) brought them to Fārs, from where they were relocated to Khurāsān by Shāh Ismā'īl I. After residing in Marv and Herat, the Qarā'īs finally settled in Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya. The Jalāyirs were brought to Khurāsān by Tīmūr Lang (C. E. Yate 1900: 53–4, 157).

³³ Dānishpazhūh 1974: 412–13.

³⁴ Dānishpazhūh 1974: 413.

³⁵ Dānishpazhūh 1974: 414–15.

³⁶ Kinneir 1813: 44.

³⁷ Sheil 1973: 393.

³⁸ See, for instance, NT 931.

³⁹ Ouseley 1819–1823 III: 151. See also Lambton 1988: 91.

⁴⁰ *Dhū al-qarnain* 496.

⁴¹ The fortunes of the shrine in Mashhad reflected the measure of control exercised by the Qājār dynasty. While it suffered a violent extraction of wealth prior to Āqā Muḥammad Shāh and Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh's conquests of Mashhad in 1796 and 1803 (Sāravī 285), it subsequently prospered and was endowed with a second courtyard (*ṣaḥn-i jadīd*) in 1818 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 496–7; NT 306). I'timād al-Saltāna, who accompanied Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh to Mashhad in 1883, gives the following description of the new courtyard: “It is approximately 72 yards (*dhar*) in length and 49 yards in width. The tilework by Ḥājji Mīrzā Mūsā Khān is of utmost distinction... In the center of the court is also a reservoir constructed by the same [master], where Haji Mīrzā Rizā Mu'min al-Saltāna (the former Mustashār al-Mulk) built a fountain (*saqqā khāna*). This court has four gates: one facing the *ivān*, which is known as the “Minting Gate” (*dar-i ṣarrābkhāna*), one leading to the lower boulevard (*khiyābān-i pā'īn*), one leading to the jewelers' market (*bāzār-i zargarhā*), one leading to the grave of Shaikh Bahā'ī. The courtyard is lined with rows of students' chambers on the upper and lower floors... There are two *ivāns*..., the northern leading to the ... lower boulevard and the southern leading to the attendants' drinking hall (*sharbat khāna*) and kitchen (*āshpaz khāna*) (MSh II: 135–6, 157; see also C. E. Yate 1900: 322). The new courtyard was later embellished by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (*Glory of the Shia World*: 261). In addition, Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh donated five gold lamps to the shrine (KR 72 (Patterson 1988: 52)). During his visit in June 1833, Fraser primarily noticed signs of decay as compared with 1821: “I made my way to the Sahn, or great square, once forbidden to me, now open to all Europeans; but I scarcely knew it again; all its beauty was gone; its glory had departed... The beautiful minaret of azure and

THE QĀJĀR MODE OF GOVERNMENT

Fath ‘Alī Shāh treated the provinces of his realm as an extension of Qājār interests and overwhelmingly reserved their administration for members of his own family.⁴² While the control of the highest levels of provincial government rested with the most prominent among Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s relatives, local affairs were not affected by the administration in a deep or lasting manner. Rather, Qājār policies fostered the entrenchment of a tribal elite, which looked after the affairs within the tribe and policed other groups located even further on the margins of the Qājār empire. The *ilkhānīs* or *ilbēgīs* appointed from among the leading families of the larger tribes were generally also in charge of revenue collection and the administration of customary law. As is well attested for the Shādillū Kurd leadership of Bujnūrd, the tribal nobility often held their lands free in return for military service.⁴³

Qājār notions of empire were offset by an extremely limited government presence on the ground. Even within the core regions of the empire, sovereignty rested less on instances of direct physical control than on a loose system of tribal allegiances. Qājār efforts to impose the government stamp were most successful in central and western Iran, specifically along the axis linking Bushire, Isfahān, Tehran and Tabriz.⁴⁴ The connection with the large province of Khurāsān was much more tenuous. Like earlier regimes, the Qājārs faced the difficulty of extending their power through the geographical bottleneck created by the southern face of the Alburz Mountains in the north and the Dasht-i Kavīr in the south. Along this narrow colonized strip, the towns of Sabzavār, Nīshāpūr and Mashhad were linked by the highroad to Tehran and formed a narrow isthmus of government control.⁴⁵

Compared with the local leadership in other parts of the Qājār realm, the Khurāsānī nobility was particularly successful in retaining its hold over local affairs. Tribal structures displayed a great amount of resilience towards changes in the larger political setting. They survived the turmoil following the decline of the Safavid empire unscathed and helped to maintain a minimum of local security and order in a setting of eroding state structures. The continued strength of the tribal nobility effectively countermanded the expansion of government control. Unable to transcend or dissolve local patterns of authority, the Qājār government employed the tribal leadership as a sort of subsidiary government and entrusted it with the collection of revenue and the provision of military services. This royal recognition in turn enhanced the control the tribal leaders wielded over local affairs. Their relatively secure position is also reflected by the fact that, individual reprisals by state forces notwithstanding, they enjoyed greater stability and continuity than the provincial governors, who had to bargain with the court for the retention of their posts at relatively short intervals.⁴⁶

Confronted with the continued strength of the Khurāsānī leadership, the provincial governors had to strike a precarious balance between control and conciliation. One possible strategy open to the Qājār princes based in Mashhad was the cultivation of individual allies and the exploitation of the rivalries existing among the

gold erected by Shah Ismael [should be Shāh Ṭahmāsp I], had been so shook or damaged, that for fear of its falling they had taken it down; and the splendid azure-lettered inscriptions on the neck of the golden dome, were turned to a dusty grey. The beautiful gateways at either end of the Sahn had suffered a corresponding dilapidation. The tiles were everywhere peeling off, and the freshness of their colours quite tarnished. Even the exquisite...water-house, in the centre of the square, constructed of a kind of filigree work in gilded wood, was falling to pieces, and all its gilding was gone” (Fraser 1973: 211–12). When Qājār authority reached a low point during Ḥasan Khān Sālār’s rebellion in 1847–1850, the shrine was once again depleted of its precious candlesticks, golden railings and silver doors (C. E. Yate 1900: 324–5). Between 1853 and 1855, the Qājār governor Farīdūn Mīrzā engaged in repairs. In 1859, the administrator (*mutavallī*) erected a golden door and a guest house for pilgrims and the poor by order of the king. During his visit in 1867, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh signalled his devotion by taking the jeweled aigrette from his hat and presenting it to the shrine (C. E. Yate 1900: 325). For a map of the shrine in the 1880s, see MSh II: 500.

⁴² Drouville 1825 II: 2–4; Fraser 1825: 203. See also Meredith 1971: 66; Migeod 1990: 8.

⁴³ Lambton 1988: 69.

⁴⁴ Migeod 1990: 31.

⁴⁵ Curzon 1966 I: 203–4, 245, 255–6; Migeod 1990: 66.

⁴⁶ Sheikholeslami 1997: 85–88, 191, 193–4.

various leaders. The ongoing renegotiation of the political balance of power is reflected by Kinneir's statement that the tribal leaders were

both from birth and influence, the first men in the empire; they are always mutually jealous and hostile; and the King, by fomenting their quarrels, and thus nicely balancing the power of the one against that of the other, insures his own safety and the peace of his dominions. It is the custom to detain at court, either the chief himself or some part of his family, as hostages for the fidelity of the tribe.⁴⁷

At times this policy backfired, and the Qājār princes fell prey to local machinations or found themselves beaten by their own weapons. On the other hand, the pursuance of all too energetic policies to further government control carried the danger of alienating crucial local allies. One possible scenario was wholesale rebellion, as Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh's first governor to the region, Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā (1803–1816) was to find out during the three final years of his governorship. In 1820, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh took issue with the forceful measures his son Ḥasan 'Alī Mīrzā Shujā' al-Saltāna had adopted towards the local leadership during the first few years of his governorship of Khurāsān (1816–1827). The king expressed his fear that Shujā' al-Saltāna's campaigns against a number of tribal strongholds might do more harm than good. In his opinion, the cooperation of the Jalāyir, Hazāra, Baghāyirī, Arab, Qarā'ī and Tīmūrī leadership was more vital for the furtherance of Qājār authority than short-term military success:

Other than these leaders there is no one in Khurāsān [to support you], with the exception of three Kurdish and Turkish *khāns*... In short, there is no one left in the entire province who is satisfied with my son's policies. If all of Khurāsān has lost its confidence [in you], how, then, can the affairs there be settled in a satisfactory fashion?⁴⁸

In the early nineteenth century, the politics of Khurāsān were moulded by the interests of the Qarā'ī leadership of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya and the Za'farānlū Kurd chiefs of Khabūshān. Iṣḥāq Khān Qarā'ī used his prominent role in the provincial government to carve out an independent power base for himself in the region bordering on the principality of Herat until he met with a violent death in 1816. A decade later, the weakness of the provincial government temporarily allowed the rivalling Qarā'ī and Za'farānlū clans to split up the core regions of Khurāsān among themselves. During his governorship from 1831–1833, 'Abbās Mīrzā Nā'ib al-Saltāna successfully removed the influential Za'farānlū and Qarā'ī chiefs from power. Even so, his efforts to strengthen Mashhad's position vis-à-vis the tribal leadership crumbled with his death in October 1833. British observers noted that the difficult situation Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's troops experienced before Herat in 1837–1838 derived not so much from the inherent strength of Herat's defences than from the fact that the Qājārs were operating from a weak base. In fact, there was little common purpose between the Qājār crown and the Khurāsānī leadership:

[T]he Shah will not for some time be in a position to command success against Herat, which is defended not only by its strong walls and its citadel, but by the intrigues of the Persian Chiefs, and even Governors in Khorassan, who find themselves more important and more caressed, while there is an enemy at hand, than they could hope to be if Herat were taken, or matters amicably adjusted with that Government.⁴⁹

This prediction held true for the outcome of the siege of Herat and for the developments in Khurāsān during the latter part of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's reign, as the province was shaken by a three-year rebellion. Instigated by Ḥasan Khān Sālār, the son of the Qājār governor Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula, this uprising was supported by Ja'far Qulī Khān Shādillū of Bujnūrd during its early stages and reached its climax with the occupation of Mashhad in 1848–1850. Their often doubtful loyalty notwithstanding, the leaders of Khabūshān, Bujnūrd and Darra Gaz made an instant comeback after the conclusion of the rebellion and assumed a pivotal role in the administration of northern and northeastern Khurāsān and the military campaigns to Sarakhs, Marv and Herat in the 1850s.

The position of the tribal leadership was further enhanced in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. During Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's reign (1848–1896), the relationship between the crown and

⁴⁷ Kinneir 1813: 45.

⁴⁸ Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh to Shujā' al-Saltāna, Jumādā II 1236/March 1820, quoted in *Zanbīl* 281. See also Mīr Niyā 1994: 46–7.

⁴⁹ McNeill to Macnaghten, Tehran, 22 January 1837 (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1, Part II, No. 50, pp. 47–8).

the Khurāsānī nobility was put on a formal footing. In exchange for their incorporation in the provincial government, the most prominent leaders received high-sounding titles and enjoyed extensive prerogatives in their home territories and beyond. A first round of titles was distributed during Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's first visit to Khurāsān in 1867, which aimed at restoring confidence in Qājār rule in the aftermath of the disgraceful defeat of the Iranian troops at Marv in 1860.⁵⁰ The appointments following in the 1890s, by contrast, reflected a shift in power in favor of the Qājār court. In order to maintain their hereditary claims to power, the local leadership had to submit substantial fees to the Shāh, the prime minister, the governor-general, and the *vazīr* of Khurāsān. The government, on its part, based the appointments of local governors on the value of the presents received, thus fanning local rivalries and hastening the financial ruin of many leading families.⁵¹

THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY OF KHURĀSĀN

THE ZA'FARĀNLŪ KURDS OF KHABŪSHĀN

As early as 1215/1800–01, the Za'farānlūs, then described as lords of Chinārān, were extolled for their courage and warlike disposition:

Their winter and summer quarters (*qishlāq*, *yailāq*) extend across the mountains of Akhlūmad [Akhlamad]. At the time of the martyred Sultān [Shāh Sultān Ḥusain], they were estimated to number 180,000 families. Their young men are handsome, tall, of strong physique and courageous. Their troops consist entirely of cavalry. One hundred of their cavalry are considered equal to 1,000 cavalry furnished by other tribes (*qaum*). They do not resort to rifles in battle and say that war conducted by means of rifles is not a war among men (*jang ba tufang jang-i mardān nīst*), because [even] a woman can achieve victory over a hundred horsemen by means of a bullet. In their opinion, cannons are for the conquest of forts (*qal'a shikanī*), and they view this sort of warfare as deceitful. Therefore, they fight with spears and swords; and a minority resorts to bow and arrow.⁵²

The prominent role of the Za'farānlū leadership in the politics of Khurāsān is fairly well documented from the Nadirid era onward. Ja'far Khān Za'farānlū was one of the leading figures in the power struggle engulfing Khurāsān after Nādir Shāh's death in 1747. Until his defeat and blinding in 1751–52, he was the most powerful antagonist of Mīr 'Alam I Khuzaima of Qāyīn and Yūsuf 'Alī Khān Jalāyir of Kalāt, and temporarily deposed Nādir Shāh's grandson Shāh Rukh Afshār.

In the early nineteenth century, Amīr Gūna Khān Za'farānlū of Khabūshān⁵³ was one of the prominent military leaders of Khurāsān.⁵⁴ Following historical precedents, he had received the titles of "*īlkhānī*" and "*amīr al-umarā*" from Āqā Muḥammad Khān in 1210/1796.⁵⁵ Contrary to the Za'farānlū leadership of Chinārān,⁵⁶ Amīr Gūna Khān was a steadfast ally of the Qājārs and entered a marriage alliance with Faṭḥ

⁵⁰ Sheikholeslami 1997: 83.

⁵¹ C. E. Yate 1900: 60–1, 183. This ongoing circulation of gifts in cash and kind from the periphery to the center and government reciprocation in the form of fiscal favors granted to local officials has been characterized by Sheikholeslami as the most dynamic aspect of an "otherwise stagnant economy" (Sheikholeslami 1997: 115).

⁵² Dānishpazhūh 1974: 410.

⁵³ The available sources alternately identify the Kurdish leadership of Khabūshān as "Za'farānlū" (Kāzīm 75, 77, 107, 590; *Dhū al-qarnain* 111; TRSN IX: 363; NT 103) or "Sa'dānlū" (Dānishpazhūh 1974: 410–411).

⁵⁴ *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 74, 114, 161–6, 239–45, 338–40, 397, 414.

⁵⁵ *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 69.

⁵⁶ Chinārān was the seat of Mamish Khān (d. ca. 1217/1802), who was another influential Za'farānlū leader in the late eighteenth century. In 1780–81, he temporarily removed Shāh Rukh Afshār from the government of Mashhad (*Gulshan-i murād* 645–7; see also Dānishpazhūh 1974: 410; Fūfālzā'ī 1967: 263–6). Mamish Khān submitted to Āqā Muḥammad Qājār in 1210/1796, but subsequently rebelled against his successor Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 68; Bāmdād 1992 IV: 158). When Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā assumed office as the first Qājār governor of Mashhad in 1218/1803, he faced the opposition of Mamish Khān's nephew Naqd 'Alī Khān, who took position at the fort of Chinārān (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 80–3, 129, 142–4).

‘Alī Shāh.⁵⁷ Amīr Gūna Khān’s descendants assumed a powerful position for the greater part of the nineteenth century. The continuing prominence of the Kurdish leadership is reflected by the fact that Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh paid visits to their seats in Bujnūrd and Khabūshān on the occasion of his trips to Khurāsān in early 1284/summer 1867 and Ramaẓān 1300/July 1883.⁵⁸

The Za‘farānlū leaders of Khabūshān were able to maintain their position as “the most powerful vassals of the Persian crown”, notwithstanding recurring instances of antagonism.⁵⁹ Despite a temporary detainment in the capital, Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū’s son Amīr Ḥusain gained the title of “Shujā‘ al-Daula” in 1867 and presided over the affairs of Khabūshān and the neighboring regions from 1865 until his death in 1893.⁶⁰ Yet the royal attempts at conciliation were accompanied by efforts at playing the Za‘farānlū and Shādillū leaders off against each other. In 1281/1864, Amīr Ḥusain Khān briefly gained the governorship of Bujnūrd.⁶¹ Nine years later, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh ordered Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū Sihām al-Daula to curb the expansionist activities of his Za‘farānlū counterpart Amīr Ḥusain Khān.⁶² After the death of the Za‘farānlū leader in 1893, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh repeatedly switched the governorship between Amīr Ḥusain Khān’s son and his nephew and, by fuelling the competition between them, extracted increasing gifts of money from both sides.⁶³

THE SHĀDILLŪ KURDS OF BUJNŪRD

The Shādillū leaders of Bujnūrd maintained their hold over the neighboring areas of Jājarm and Isfarāyīn, as well as over Astarābād and the adjacent Turkmen regions well into the 1890s. This lineage figures in the politics of Khurāsān from the early Qājār period on. In the early nineteenth century, Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū received the title of *īlkhānī* from Fath ‘Alī Shāh for his attempts to rein in the Turkmens in the Tejend region.⁶⁴ Carrying the title of *mīr-i panj*, his son Ja‘far Qulī Khān Shādillū controlled the government of Astarābād in addition to his possessions in Bujnūrd from 1271/1854 until his death in 1275/1858–59.⁶⁵ Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū’s third son Ḥaidar Qulī Khān (d. 1288/1871–72) was the first Shādillū leader to receive the title of Sihām al-Daula around 1281/1864. His nephew and successor Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū (d. 1322/1904–5) gained this title in 1298/1880–81. Ḥaidar Qulī Khān’s brothers Shīr Muḥammad Khān Shādillū and Muḥammad Qulī Khān Shādillū held the governorships of Jājarm/Isfarāyīn and Turbat-i Shaikh Jām respectively.

While the government of Astarābād mostly rested with Qājār representatives, the Shādillū leadership continued to make its influence felt there. Between 1281–1284/1864–1867, Ḥaidar Qulī Khān conducted two military campaigns to Astarābād.⁶⁶ His successor Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū governed Astarābād from late 1302–Rajab 1304/late 1885–March/April 1887.⁶⁷ At the time of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s second visit to Khurāsān in Ramaẓān 1300/July 1883, Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū was in charge of administering the

⁵⁷ Amīr Gūna Khān’s daughter was married to Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s fifth son Ḥusain ‘Alī Mīrzā Farmānfarmā during Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s first campaign to Khurāsān in the summer of 1213–14/1799 (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 69; TRSN IX: 353; NT 103; TMN 1452). See also Komaki 1995: 81.

⁵⁸ Mīr Niyā 1994: 156, 205; Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 396–7. During his first visit to Bujnūrd, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh ordered the Za‘farānlū leader Amīr Ḥusain Shujā‘ al-Daula and the Shādillū leader Ḥaidar Qulī Khān Sihām al-Daula to organize a raid against the Yomut Turkmens of Gurgān (Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 378–87).

⁵⁹ Curzon 1966 I: 101.

⁶⁰ Bāmdād 1992 I: 390–2; Migeod 1990: 64.

⁶¹ Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 368.

⁶² Gill 1874: 276; Sheikholeslami 1997: 86.

⁶³ C. E. Yate 1900: 180–2.

⁶⁴ Fraser 1973: 219. See also *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 373–4.

⁶⁵ TRSN X: 612; NT 1282, 1372–5; MSh I: 135–6; Bāmdād 1992 I: 249; Lambton 1988b: 44. For Ja‘far Qulī Khān’s policies towards the Akhal Teke Turkmens, see König 1962: 27–8. According to Polak, Ja‘far Qulī Khān died while he was governor of Astarābād (Polak 1860: 51–2).

⁶⁶ MB 1463, 1555, 1558; TMN 1894; Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 378–90.

⁶⁷ Bāmdād 1992 I: 303; IV: 401, 432–3.

Göklen Turkmens.⁶⁸ In 1894, his officials reportedly occupied a subordinate position to the Qājār governor of Astarābād, as it was their duty to collect revenue among the Göklen Turkmens of Gurgān and to submit it to the provincial government.⁶⁹

THE KHUZAIMA ARABS OF QĀYIN

Bordering the desert of Sīstān, the region of Qāyin primarily lent itself to animal husbandry and was a center of carpet weaving: “Numbers of camels are reared in the plains of Kayn, and its mountains are covered with sheep; from the wool of which, carpets of different textures are made, of a quality equal to any produced in Persia.”⁷⁰ The chief town of this region was Bīrjand, “situated under a range of low hills on the northernmost side of a fertile valley running east and west”.⁷¹ Aside from carpets, the principal products of the region were saffron, cotton textiles, raw silk, *zirishk*, dried fruits, nuts, and almonds.⁷²

The leading position of the Khuzaima Arabs in this region can be traced to the Nadirid period. In 1731, Ismā‘īl Khān Khuzaima received the government of Qāyin and Farāh. Based in Tūn, Ṭabas and Qāyin, Ismā‘īl’s son Mīr ‘Alam Khān inserted himself into the power struggle engulfing Mashhad in the aftermath of Nādir Shāh’s assassination. His career ended in the summer of the year 1754, when he was captured by Aḥmad Shāh Sadūzai and given up to his enemies for execution. During the Zand and early Qājār periods, Qāyin was held by Mīr ‘Alam Khān’s son Mīr ‘Alī Khān and his grandson Mīr ‘Alam II.⁷³

It was under Mīr ‘Alam Khān II’s grandson, Mīr ‘Alam III, that the Khuzaima Arab nobility was able to expand its sphere of influence dramatically. In 1867, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh awarded the government of Sīstān and the title of Ḥishmat al-Mulk to Mīr ‘Alam III, who garrisoned Sīstān with his own troops. He enjoyed a position even superior to that of the *īlkhānīs* of Khabūshān and Bujnūrd and was considered one of the most powerful individuals in Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s realm.⁷⁴ After his death in 1891, Mīr ‘Alam III’s possessions were split up among his sons. The elder son Mīr ‘Alī Akbar inherited his father’s title of Ḥishmat al-Mulk and gained the governorship of Sīstān, Tūn and Ṭabas. The second son, Ismā‘īl II Khuzaima, half brother of Mīr ‘Alī Akbar, received the title of Shaukat al-Mulk and the governorship of Qāyin. While the territory controlled by this family remained impressive, the Qājār government effectively reduced the sphere of authority of the individual governors in charge. This is also reflected by the fact that the use of the evocative title of *amīr*, which had been conferred on the rulers of Qāyin as early as the seventeenth century, was

⁶⁸ Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū seems to have used his governorship of Astarābād to convey large sums of money to Bujnūrd (Tavahhūdī 1985 II: 394, 397–8).

⁶⁹ C. E. Yate 1900: 215, 217–8.

⁷⁰ Malcolm 1829 II: 224.

⁷¹ The water supply of Bīrjand was secured by four large *qanāts*. Towards the end of the drought of 1870–72, the town consisted of 3,000 dome-roofed mud-built houses with 15,000 inhabitants. It had six caravanserais and about 200 shops (Goldsmid 1876 I: 336). During the same period, the population of the town of Qāyin was estimated at 2,500 inhabitants. The town possessed “from seventy to eighty wretched shops, three *hammāms*, and two ruined caravanserais...” Owing to the drought, the local industry had declined: “In happier days the district could show large yields of silk and saffron; but the three terrible years of drought that have passed over it have so blighted the mulberry-trees, that last year’s yield of silk was not more than one-fourth of the average, while the cultivation of wheat has everywhere superseded that of saffron.” (Goldsmid 1876 I: 341).

⁷² Goldsmid 1876 I: 336.

⁷³ Mojtahed-Zadeh 2004: 63–4.

⁷⁴ Curzon 1966 I: 200; Sheikholeslami 1997: 180. The Goldsmid delegation met Mīr ‘Alam III at the newly founded Qājār garrison of Nuṣratābād in Sīstān in February 1872. Major Euan Smith describes him as “a tall fine-looking man, of some forty-five years old, rather dark, with a countenance principally noticeable for the immense size of the jaw bones, which project from his face like fins. He wears a thick moustache, is not unlike the Shah, and his expression – though somewhat stern and cruel, with a want of frankness in it – can at times be made very courteous and engaging. On the occasion of the first visit paid him by Captains Lovett and Smith, he was dressed in a magnificent Kashmīr robe trimmed with sable, and seated in an upstairs room inside the inner citadel of the Shahr-i-Kadīm, carpeted with unusually handsome rugs, and hung round with pistols and guns...” (Goldsmid 1876 I: 267).

dropped. The neutral designation of *ḥukmrān*, “governor”, which was adopted instead, carried no connotation of historical entitlement.⁷⁵

THE ZANGŪ’Ī ARABS OF ṬABAS (GĪLAKĪ)

The Arab geographers noted the existence of two towns by this name. This town they called Ṭabas al-Tamr (“Tabas of the Date Palm”) to distinguish it from Ṭabas al-‘Unnāb (“Tabas of the Jujube Tree”) located four stages east of Bīrjand. From the eleventh century on, the two towns came to be known as Ṭabas Gīlakī and Ṭabas Masīnā respectively.⁷⁶ The Persian chronicles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries generally mention Tūn and Ṭabas in conjunction, indicating that they were understood as an administrative unit. In the early nineteenth century, Malcolm described Ṭabas as an insular oasis, surrounded by thirty miles of desert in every direction. Camel breeding and tobacco constituted the major sources of income.⁷⁷

The role of the leading Zangū’ī family as governors of Ṭabas dated back to Afsharid times. Nādir Shāh is said to have conferred the district on ‘Alī Mardān Khān Zangū’ī in return for services rendered in the Dasht-i Lūt.⁷⁸ He lost his life while battling Aḥmad Shāh Sadūzai’s troops in 1770.⁷⁹ At the time of Tīmūr Shāh and Shāh Zamān Sadūzai, ‘Alī Mardān Khān’s grandson Mīr Ḥasan Khān Zangū’ī (d. 1235/1819–20) governed Ṭabas and, hence, the “Bandar-i Lūt”, the gateway to the desert.⁸⁰ In the nineteenth century, the Zangū’ī chiefs were known as the *vakīls* of Ṭabas and consistently cooperated with the Qājār governors of Mashhad. Like the other leaders of Khurāsān, Ḥājī Muḥammad Bāqir Khān of Ṭabas received a prestigious title from Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in 1867. Henceforth known as ‘Imād al-Mulk, he controlled the affairs of Ṭabas without major government interference until his death in 1894. The final years of the nineteenth century, by contrast, were characterized by several rounds of intense bargaining between Muḥammad Bāqir Khān’s three sons and Mīr ‘Alī Akbar Khān Khuzaima Ḥishmat al-Mulk, the governor of Sīstān, for the succession to the governorship of Ṭabas. At the end of this process, in the course of which a great part of the funds necessary for gifts to the court and the provincial government were raised by the sale of land, the eldest son ‘Alī Akbar Khān Zangū’ī gained this coveted post and the title of ‘Imād al-Mulk.⁸¹

THE QARĀ’IS OF TURBAT-I ḤAIDARĪYA

Contrary to the leading Khurāsānī families discussed so far, the Qarā’ī leadership of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya already suffered decisive inroads into their sphere of influence in the early 1830s. The Qarā’īs had been intermittently involved in the administration of Mashhad since Aḥmad Shāh had appointed Amīr Khān Qarā’ī as military governor (*sardār*) of Khurāsān and assigned the government of Tūn and Ṭabas to him.⁸² Prior to the advent of Āqā Muḥammad Qājār in 1796, Amīr Khān Qarā’ī’s son Ishāq Khān was said to control the entire region between Mashhad and Khvāf, and hence the major southern trade routes in the region leading to Herat and Ṭabas. As “first merchant” in this region, he exported dried fruit produced on his

⁷⁵ C. E. Yate 1900: 65–6. See also Sykes 1902b.

⁷⁶ Krawulsky 1982: 46; Krawulsky 1984: 40; Sykes 1906: 562.

⁷⁷ Malcolm 1829 II: 223. On the occasion of his visit to Ṭabas in October 1880, C. E. Stewart observed that the town did not live up to the expectations Malcolm’s portrayal had raised: “Sir John Malcolm has thrown a sort of halo over Tabbas by his description of it..., but it is really a very ordinary town. A portion of it is fortified with a deep ditch and walls, stronger and in better repair than is usual in Persia. The gates are also thickly plated with iron, and though of course not a strong place, it is in better order than most Persian towns, where, if the gate is strong enough to resist being kicked in by a Turkoman’s horse, it is considered sufficient. The fortified portion contains about 5000 inhabitants, but the mass of the people live outside” (Stewart 1881: 522).

⁷⁸ Sykes 1906: 562.

⁷⁹ Fūfalzā’ī 1967: 123, 435.

⁸⁰ Fūfalzā’ī 1967: 49, 267. See also Fūfalzā’ī 1958: 325–6;

⁸¹ C. E. Yate 1900: 59–61. See also Curzon 1966 I: 202–3; Sykes 1906: 564.

⁸² According to *Tārīkh-i aḥmadshāhī*, Amīr Khān Qarā’ī already controlled Tūn, Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya, Zāva-Maḥvilāt at the time of Aḥmad Shāh’s siege of Mashhad in the summer of 1167/1754 (TA (ed. Humāyūn) 180. See also *Mujmal al-tavārīkh* (Mann) 114–15; *Mujmal al-tavārīkh* (Raḥavī) 89–90; Mann 1898: 182; Yate 1900: 53–4.

own estates and had three thousand camels on hire with the caravans between India and Persia. His entire income was estimated at hundred thousand *tūmān*. In Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya, which grew “from an inconsiderable village into a town of consequence” under his auspices, he maintained a guest house large enough to feed five hundred persons at a time.⁸³ Ishāq Khān’s fame and reputation for economic success lingered on after his death in 1816. In spring 1830, the British traveller Conolly was told that the herds grazing around Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya during Ishāq Khān’s time were so large that fourteen hundred dogs were needed to keep watch over them.⁸⁴

Occupying a key position in relationship to Herat, Ishāq Khān Qarā’ī assumed a double role as the most crucial ally and the most powerful antagonist of the early Qājār administrators in Mashhad.⁸⁵ He effectively used his relationship with the Qājār court to widen his sphere of influence eastward to include the region of Ghūriyān. Meanwhile, his son Ḥusain Qulī Khān Qarā’ī⁸⁶ was involved with the administration of Turshīz, which was one of the core possessions of the Qājārs in the early nineteenth century.⁸⁷ Both Ishāq Khān and Ḥusain Qulī Khān Qarā’ī ultimately paid with their death for the extensive powers they enjoyed under the first Qājār governor, Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā (1803–1816). Having assumed an all too independent and overbearing position towards the provincial administration, they were executed in 1231/1816.⁸⁸ Ishāq Khān’s remaining son Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī used his position in Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya to openly defy Qājār authority by disrupting the caravan traffic in the region and engaging in slave trade.⁸⁹ In 1246/1830–31, he occupied Jām and Bākhaz.⁹⁰ Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī’s career was put to an end with his deportation to Azerbaijan in 1833. Henceforth, Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya was incorporated into the Qājār administration.⁹¹ It was governed by tribal outsiders and garrisoned by Persian troops.⁹² Even so, the family continued to control a

⁸³ According to the source quoted by Malcolm, Ishāq Khān derived thirty thousand *tūmān* from his own estates, forty thousand from his subjects, and twenty thousand from trade (Malcolm 1826 II: 226–9).

⁸⁴ In 1830, Conolly estimated the size of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya at 600–800 houses (Conolly 1834 I: 290). In December 1832, Mohan Lal reckoned that the town had no more than 5,000 inhabitants (Lal 1977: 124). In June 1845, Ferrier reported that there were more than 200 villages in the district of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya. The town itself contained 3,000 houses: “This place is walled and surrounded by a ditch, and there are bazaars, but not roofed, mosques and caravanserais; there are more than 200 villages in the district of Toorbut. The productions are opium, silk, tobacco, and fruits” (Ferrier 1857: 137).

⁸⁵ Conolly 1834 I: 290; Fūfālzā’ī 1967: 122; Mann 1898: 180; C. E. Yate 1900: 53–4. For Ishāq Khān’s central role as military leader at the beginning of Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh’s reign, see *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 72, 74, 87, 114, 116–18, 151–5, 203–5, 334, 377, 380–95, 414, 420; TRSN IX: 377.

⁸⁶ The Persian sources variously refer to Ishāq Khān Qarā’ī’s son as Ḥusain Qulī (*Dhū al-qarnain* 380) and Ḥusain ‘Alī (NT 273–4).

⁸⁷ Muṣṭafā Qulī Khān ‘Arab Mīshmast, the hereditary ruler of Turshīz, resisted the Qājār government until Rabī‘ II 1224/June 1809, when he was taken prisoner and was forced to live at the royal court. He stayed in Tehran until Ṣafar 1245/August 1829, and regained the government or Turshīz in Rajab 1245/January 1830. Shortly after, he was supplanted by his younger brother Muḥammad Taqī Khān, who in turn found himself displaced by ‘Abbās Mīrzā Nā’ib al-Saltāna’s troops in Ramaḥān 1247/February 1832 (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 132–3, 153–6, 332–6, 377–80; *Dhū al-qarnain* 719–20, 800–2; NT 185, 429).

⁸⁸ *Dhū al-qarnain* 424–5; NT 274. See also Yate 1900: 53–4.

⁸⁹ See Za‘farānlū for the case of a woman of Turshīz, who was abducted by Salor Turkmens with the connivance of Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī around 1827 and returned home 24 years later (Za‘farānlū 1968: 45–6). At the time of Conolly’s visit in the spring of 1830, Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī was rumored to have sold more than 50,000 people to the Turkmens. Not even a caravan traveling under the patronage of the influential Qājār official Mīrzā ‘Abd al-Vahhāb Mu‘tamad al-Daula was safe from his abuses (Conolly 1834 I: 290–1). Mohan Lal, who visited Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya in 1832, described Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī as “a man of cruel disposition and a slave-dealer. He was a friend of the Turkmens, and a foe of his own people, whom he sold to the former for horses or money” (Lal 1977: 120). In 1833, Fraser recounted an anecdote concerning a barber who had complained to Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī about his difficulties to provide for his progeny, the number of which he overstated. Muḥammad Khān “solved” that poor man’s problem by selling his children, and those he had presented as his own to further his case, to a Turkmen agent (Fraser 1973: 228–9). When issuing instructions to Abbās Mīrzā Nā’ib al-Saltāna in the fall of 1246/1830, Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh reasoned that it was necessary to apprehend Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī and Riḏā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū because their slave dealing “caused unrest in Iran and Tūrān” (*Dhū al-qarnain* 795–6). See also Yate 1900: 53–4.

⁹⁰ KR 70 (Patterson 1988: 47).

⁹¹ *Dhū al-qarnain* 833–6; NT 486–7, 497.

⁹² Forrest 1906: 38.

vast landed estate in the region, which is evidenced by the conflict which erupted between Muḥammad Khān Qarā'ī's son Abū al-Qāsim Khān and the governor of Mashhad in 1885.

The relatively early decline of the Qarā'ī leadership notwithstanding, the prevailing balance of power between Qājār rulers and local leadership did not shift significantly for most of the nineteenth century. Operating from a rudimentary administrative base, government representatives relied on the provincial nobility for the performance of vital tasks, such as the collection of revenue, the performance of military services, and the administration of justice. In 1285/1868–69, the troops at the disposal of the leadership of Khabūshān, Bujnūrd and Qāyin were listed as the backbone of the army of Khurāsān and Sīstān.⁹³ As their part of the bargain, the local leaders enjoyed royal recognition. They also thrived financially to the extent that they could exploit the customary gap between the revenues due to government and the income realized locally. Their loose incorporation into the Qājār state structure therefore enhanced their standing locally while engendering little or no interference from the center.⁹⁴ Yet by the 1890s, there were signs that the tribal power base was eroding. One indication of increasing government weight is the growing interference with the issues of succession which arose with the death of a number of influential tribal leaders. The Qājār government used the ongoing generational change within the local nobility to insert itself into local processes of decision-making and to remould local relationships of power according to its own interests.

The diminishing clout of the local leaders also derived from the fact that their services as the guardians of Khurāsān's frontiers increasingly became obsolete. While implying a closed space, the borders delineated with Afghanistan and Russia carried with them the advantage of greater security. In particular, the containment of the Turkmen threat in the 1880s deprived the northern tribes of their *raison d'être* as a bulwark against marauding Central Asian hordes.⁹⁵ This transition from a setting of loosely negotiated allegiances to an environment of boundedness will be treated in greater detail in the following section. The description of the political framework will be structured chronologically around the sequence of governorships and the military campaigns they involved. By reconstructing the events from the onset of Qājār authority to the end of the reign of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, I hope to shed light on the forces at play and the limitations of Qājār government, particularly on the eastern fringes of the realm.

THE QĀJĀR ADMINISTRATION OF KHURĀSĀN

Khurāsān formally became a Qājār possession in 1210/1796,⁹⁶ when Āqā Muḥammad conquered Mashhad and attempted to eradicate all traces of Afsharid control. In revenge for the death of his grandfather Fath 'Alī Khān Qājār, he had the remains of Nādir Shāh dug up and sent to Tehran. Shāh Rukh Afshār, Nādir Shāh's grandson and representative of the Sadūzai empire, suffered great abuse and subsequently succumbed to the rigors of deportation. Meanwhile, his son Nādir Mīrzā Afshār took refuge at the Sadūzai court in Kābul and later moved to Herat.⁹⁷ Yet Qājār authority in Khurāsān crumbled with the death of Āqā Muḥammad on 21

⁹³ MB 1590. In 1875, Napier reported that the regular army of Mashhad consisted of three regiments of infantry, of about 800 men, which rotated in the garrisons of Kalāt and Sarakhs. The irregular forces, by comparison, were much more formidable in numbers. Napier estimated that 10,000 peasants could be raised on short notice. Among the troops available locally, the Kurds had the greatest fighting strength. The cavalry of Mashhad was furnished by Hazāra, Tīmūrī and Jamshīdī mercenaries (Napier 1875: 223–5).

⁹⁴ Sheikholeslami 1997: 86–8, 146, 191.

⁹⁵ Curzon 1966 I: 111; Migeod 1990: 65–6.

⁹⁶ Āqā Muḥammad Khān embarked on his journey from Tehran to Astarābād and Khurāsān on 7 Dhū al-Qa'da 1210/14 May 1796 (Sāravī 283; NT 80; TMN 1432; FN 663).

⁹⁷ Sāravī 286–8; Boukhary 145–50; Persian text, p. 64–66; TRSN IX: 279; NT 80–81; FN I: 663–4, Busse 1972: 69–70. See also Champagne 1981: 49; Fūfālzā'ī 1958: 65, 184; Quddūsī 1960: 440.

Dhū al-Ḥijja 1211/17 June 1797.⁹⁸ The local leaders reasserted their independence, and the following year Nādir Mīrzā was able to return to Mashhad with Sadūzai support.⁹⁹

A year after his official coronation in 1212/1798, Āqā Muḥammad's successor Fath 'Alī Shāh directed his attention to Khurāsān.¹⁰⁰ In the course of three military campaigns in the summers of 1213–1214/1799,¹⁰¹ 1214–1215/1800¹⁰² and 1217/1802,¹⁰³ he forced the leadership of Sabzavār and Nīshāpūr to submit. The focus of the first and third campaigns was on Mashhad. While the local population suffered twofold from Nādir Mīrzā Afshār's extortions and from the hardships brought about by the presence of the Qājār army, Fath 'Alī Shāh was unable to establish direct authority there. Despite waning popular backing, Nādir Mīrzā continued to hold his own. During the first siege of 1799, the local ulama and *sayyids* willingly served as intermediaries but subsequently became increasingly estranged from the Afshār leader. On his part, Nādir Mīrzā turned against the leading 'ālim Mīrzā Muḥammad Mihdī, who had served as the *mutavallī* of Imām Rizā's shrine since the late 1770s¹⁰⁴ and whose growing popularity reflected general discontent with the deteriorating conditions in Mashhad. Finding himself besieged by the newly appointed Qājār governor Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā from 20 Ṣafār 1218/11 June 1803 on, Nādir Mīrzā lost the last vestiges of local support when he pillaged the tomb of Imām Rizā to pay his troops. On 1 Ramaẓān 1218/15 December 1803, he fled from Mashhad after inflicting a mortal wound on his antagonist Mīrzā Muḥammad Mihdī. Within a short time, he was apprehended and sent to Tehran for execution.¹⁰⁵ In revenge for the abuses committed by Nādir Mīrzā, the ulama of Mashhad demolished the tomb of his great-grandfather Nādir Shāh.¹⁰⁶

The actual scope of Qājār control over Khurāsān in the early nineteenth century is reflected by the aforementioned statement of 1215/1800–01, which compares the revenues and troops at the disposal of Fath 'Alī Shāh with those commanded by the Safavid ruler Shāh Sultan Ḥusain. In 1128/1715–16, that is, seven years prior to the downfall of the Safavid Empire, Khurāsān was still reported to comprise, in theory at least, three large *bēglərbēgīs* covering the entire space between Kirmān and Sīstān in the west, and Kābul and Ghaznī in the east. The prospects presented by the account of Fath 'Alī Shāh's revenue base, by contrast, were much more modest. Thus the Qājār king was reported to derive the bulk of his income in Khurāsān from the western towns of Simnān, Dāmghān, Shāhrūd, Būstān (Bīṣtām?), Sīstān (?) and Biyārjumand.¹⁰⁷ The report concludes with the remark that Sabzavār and Nīshāpūr had been added to the tax rolls only one year earlier, possibly as a result of Fath 'Alī Shāh's second campaign to Khurāsān, while the remaining towns and tribes of Khurāsān had failed to submit any revenues whatsoever at the time of writing.¹⁰⁸

⁹⁸ Lambton, "Kadjar," *E.I.* 2, IV: 391; Perry, "Āgā Moḥammad Khan Qājār," *E.Ir.* I: 604. According to Imām al-Dīn Ḥusainī and Faiz Muḥammad, Āqā Muḥammad was killed on 14 Muḥarram 1212/9 July 1797 (T Hu 471, ST 55; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 87).

⁹⁹ *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 66; ST 55; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 87–8. See also Fūfalzā'i 1958: 100–2, 184.

¹⁰⁰ Fath 'Alī Shāh ascended to the throne on 4 Ṣafār 1212/29 July 1797. His official coronation took place in Tehran on 1 Shavvāl 1212/19 March 1798 (Amanat, "Fath 'Alī Shah Qājār," *E.Ir.* IX: 408).

¹⁰¹ The Qājār troops left Tehran on 15 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1213/20 May 1799 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 106), encamped before Mashhad from 1–15 Rabī' I 1214/3–17 August 1799 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 111, TRSN IX: 352–3), and returned to Tehran on 15 Rabī' II [1214]/16 September 1799 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 113). See also TRSN IX: 349–56; TMN 1452; Komaki 1995: 81. According to Lisān al-Mulk, Fath 'Alī Shāh returned to Tehran on 11 Rabī' II 1214/12 September 1799 (NT 103).

¹⁰² Fath 'Alī Shāh left Tehran on 9 Dhū al-Ḥijja [1214]/8 May 1800 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 135), advanced to Sabzavār in Muḥarram 1215/May–June 1800 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 135–6), and arrived in Tehran on 14 Rabī' II [1215]/4 September 1800 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 139). See also TRSN IX: 363–4; NT 108–9; TMN 1456–7; Elphinstone 1992 II: 321; Komaki 1995: 81.

¹⁰³ Fath 'Alī Shāh set out from Tehran on 17 Muḥarram 1217/20 May 1802 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 163), besieged Mashhad from 9 Rabī' I [1217]/10 July 1802 for one month (*Dhū al-qarnain* 164), and reached Tehran on 7 Jumādā I [1217]/5 September 1802 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 165). See also TRSN IX: 376–80; TMN 1463–4; Komaki 1995: 81.

¹⁰⁴ *Gulshan-i murād* 643, 645.

¹⁰⁵ *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 67–8, 86, 111–27. According to Fazlullāh Shīrāzī, Nādir Mīrzā Afshār was executed in late Dhū al-Qa'da [1218]/March 1804 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 177–9;). See also NT 121; TRSN IX: 385–6; TMN 1467–8.

¹⁰⁶ Lockhart 1938: 264n.

¹⁰⁷ In the late nineteenth century, Biyārjumand was a subdistrict of Shāhrūd-Bīṣtām (*Gaz. Iran* II: 78).

¹⁰⁸ Dānishpazhūh 1974: 417–21.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MUḤAMMAD VALĪ MĪRZĀ (1218–1231/1803—1816)¹⁰⁹

The Qājār conquest of Mashhad on 10 Ramaẓān 1218/24 Dec 1803 coincided with a period of weakness in the Sadūzai domain, as the relationships of power in Kābul, Qandahār and Herat were shaken up in the aftermath of the forceful transition of power from Shāh Zamān to his half brother Maḥmūd in 1800–01.¹¹⁰ The favorable circumstances on the eastern frontier were outweighed by the need to contain Russian intervention in the Caucasus, and Qājār presence in Khurāsān remained relatively weak for the next decade. The first Qājār governor Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā, who was fifteen years old at the time of his appointment, commanded poor financial and military resources and required the support of the local nobility to maintain a semblance of authority.¹¹¹ This in turn restricted his ability to maneuver vis-à-vis the Khurāsānī leadership. For the first ten years after assuming office, Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā maintained his position by means of a close alliance with Ishāq Khān of Turbat-i Ḥaidariya. The Qarā'ī leader, who had already enjoyed special favors under Āqā Muḥammad Shāh,¹¹² “very soon became so powerful, that he controlled the prince, who found he could do nothing of which his general did not approve.”¹¹³ Ishāq Khān used his alliance with Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā to extend his dominions eastward. Upon the conquest of Ghūriyān in Ramaẓān 1219/December 1804, Ishāq Khān's nephew Yūsuf ‘Alī Khān Qarā'ī was appointed governor.¹¹⁴ Ishāq Khān was thus in the position to exert pressure on the intervening areas of Bākharz and Jām and to assume a pivotal role in all policies concerning Herat.¹¹⁵

The developments of the early nineteenth century were linked to the uncertain status of Herat as a Qājār tributary and the semi-independent status of the contiguous Qarā'ī possessions. This led to a number of changing coalitions among the local leadership and posed a constant challenge to Qājār authority. Ghūriyān, located 40 miles west of Herat, became the focus of three military campaigns in 1807, 1811, and 1814. In the course of these events, the Qarā'ī leader and his nephew sought to bolster their position by fanning the rivalry between the lords of Mashhad and Herat to their own advantage. In 1807, Yūsuf ‘Alī Khān Qarā'ī entered an intrigue with Ḥājji Fīrūz al-Dīn Sadūzai of Herat and encouraged him to extend his authority westward into Khurāsān. In his designs against Mashhad, Fīrūz al-Dīn was supported by his Naqshbandī *murshid* Ṣūfī Islām and the head of the Sunnī ulama of Herat, Ḥājji Mullā Mūsā. During the battle of Shāda on 22 Rabī' II 1222/29 June 1807, Fīrūz al-Dīn's forces suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā's deputy (*nā'ib*) Muḥammad Khān Qājār.¹¹⁶ Ṣūfī Islām was among the 4,000–6,000 Herati casualties of this confrontation.¹¹⁷ After finding himself besieged for forty days in Herat, Fīrūz al-Dīn submitted two years' revenue (*kharāj*) to Muḥammad Khān Qājār.¹¹⁸

The next Qājār campaign against Herat in Jumādā II–Rajab 1226/July 1811 was brought about by Fīrūz al-Dīn's failure to submit revenues (*kharāj*) and his apparent designs to regain control over Ghūriyān. On this occasion, the mere threat of a military confrontation served as a reminder to Fīrūz al-Dīn of his obligations towards the Qājār court. When Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā moved with his troops via Ghūriyān to

¹⁰⁹ Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā (b. 1203/1788–89) was the fourth son of Fath 'Alī Shāh (Mīr Niyā 1994: 22).

¹¹⁰ See Chapter 3, footnote 207.

¹¹¹ Fraser 1825: 225.

¹¹² FN I: 663, Busse 1972: 69.

¹¹³ Fraser 1825, Appendix B: 26.

¹¹⁴ *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 203–6.

¹¹⁵ *Dhū al-qarnain* 265–6; KR 62–3 (Patterson 1988: 18–20, 24).

¹¹⁶ *Dhū al-qarnain* 267, 328. See also *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 380–423; TMN 1486; T Su 185.

¹¹⁷ The figures given for the heavy losses of the Herati troops vary. According to Muḥammad Taqī Nūrī, 4,000 men were killed and 2,000 were taken prisoner (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 421). Faẓlullāh Shīrāzī reports 6,000 troops died and 3,000 were taken prisoner (*Dhū al-qarnain* 267).

¹¹⁸ *Dhū al-qarnain* 268, 328. According to Riyāzī, Fīrūz al-Dīn submitted three years' taxes at that point (KR 62 (Patterson 1988: 18–21)). Sulṭān Muḥammad Durrānī mentions a tribute of 100,000 rupees, 100 bolts of cashmere shawl cloth and an elephant (T Su 185). See also Boukhary 83–84; NT 161–3; ST 74–5; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 121–2.

Pul-i Nuqra near Herat, Fīrūz al-Dīn readily submitted and sent in the revenues of Herat through his son Malik Ḥusain Sadūzai.¹¹⁹

The following conflict about Ghūriyān coincided with an unfolding rebellion by the Khurāsānī leadership. In the summer of 1228/1813, the relationship between Muḥammad Valī Mīrẓā and the nobility of Khurāsān deteriorated. The author of *Nāsikh al-tavārīkh* attributes the ensuing conflict to the impolite and impolitic attitude of the young prince: “Whenever he detected a hint of rebelliousness among the great ones... he would fly into a rage and abuse their ancestors and descendants with filthy language. The nobles of that territory suffered these ignominies for years unable to give vent to the darkness in their hearts...,” until they heard about the heavy territorial losses in the final phase of the Russo-Persian war. In a meeting convened in the steppe of Gurgān, Ishāq Khān and the other Khurāsānī nobles present decided to depose Muḥammad Valī Mīrẓā. The active phase of the rebellion began shortly before the conclusion of the treaty of Gulistān on 13 September 1813. On 27 Sha‘bān 1228/25 August 1813, the Khurāsānī leadership attacked the royal herds in Chinārān and plundered in the surroundings of Mashhad. Unaware of Ishāq Khān’s leading role in the revolt, Muḥammad Valī Mīrẓā summoned the Qarā’ī leader to his court. On 11 Ramaẓān 1228/7 September 1813, Qarā’ī troops occupied the fortifications of Mashhad, and Ishāq Khān deprived Muḥammad Valī Mīrẓā of his power.¹²⁰ Yet in the aftermath of this sudden success the rebellion lost momentum, as the chiefs of Khabūshān, Bujnūrd, Darra Gaz and Jahān-Arghiyān refused to acknowledge Ishāq Khān’s claims to leadership: “We are of higher standing and better birth than Ishāq Khān, and we will not serve him.”¹²¹

As the nobles took off for their respective homes, Ishāq Khān Qarā’ī’s dreams of independence crumbled. Interestingly, his submission to Muḥammad Valī Mīrẓā on ‘īd al-ḥijr 1228/27 September 1813 allowed him, at least temporarily, to slip back into his old role as a staunch supporter of Qājār interests, whereas the other leaders continued to bear the mark of rebelliousness. In the winter of 1813/14, Ishāq Khān’s son Ḥusain Qulī Khān Qarā’ī used a visit to the royal court in Tehran to explain his father’s behavior and to request royal support against the other Khurāsānī nobles. In Rabī‘ II 1229/March 1814, a military campaign against the other ringleaders of the rebellion, Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū of Khabūshān, Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū of Bujnūrd, Bēgler Khān Chāpushlū of Darra Gaz, and Sa‘adat Qulī Khān Baghāyirlū of Jahān-Arghiyān, followed.¹²²

In the meantime, Ishāq Khān pursued an independent course of action. When Fīrūz al-Dīn used the weak position of the Qājār government to lay claim to the frontier post of Ghūriyān, the local governor, Ishāq Khān’s son Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī, requested help from Fīrūz al-Dīn’s rivals in Qandahār rather than from the Qājār court. Kāmran Sadūzai, then in control of Qandahār, readily took up the offer to extend his influence into Khurāsān with Qarā’ī support. This caused Fīrūz al-Dīn to withdraw his forces from Ghūriyān and to solicit military assistance from the Qājār general Ismā‘īl Khān Dāmghānī. Upon Kāmran Sadūzai’s retreat from Herat, Fīrūz al-Dīn submitted a tribute of 50,000 *tūmān* in gold coins to Ismā‘īl Khān’s brothers. Furthermore, he promised to submit revenues on an annual basis and to perform *sikka* and *khuṭba*, the striking of coins and recitation of the Friday prayer, in the name of Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh.¹²³

As the rebellion of the Khurāsānī nobles went into its second year, Ishāq Khān was rumored to be secretly supporting their cause. In Jumādā II–Sha‘bān 1230/June–August 1815, Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh mounted an expedition against Khabūshān and Rādkān.¹²⁴ The next campaign against Rādkān in summer 1231/1816 coincided with a show of strength against Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān of Khīva.¹²⁵ While formally backing the

¹¹⁹ *Dhū al-qarnain* 328–9; NT 204–5; TMN 1500–1. See also KR 62–3 (Patterson 1988: 21–2).

¹²⁰ NT 247–8. See also Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 26.

¹²¹ NT 248–9. See also TMN 1517; Komaki 1995: 86. According to Fraser, the Kurdish leadership rejected Ishāq Khān’s ambitions to assume a leading position because of his humble beginnings as a *yasāvul* of the previous Qarā’ī chief Najaf Khān (1825 Appendix B: 25–6).

¹²² *Dhū al-qarnain* 380, 386–8; NT 249–50, 253.

¹²³ *Dhū al-qarnain* 392–3; NT 256–7; ST 88; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 144–5; KR: 63 (Patterson 1988:22–3). See also Komaki 1995: 81.

¹²⁴ *Dhū al-qarnain* 412–15; NT 268–9. See also TMN 1526.

¹²⁵ *Dhū al-qarnain* 419–24; NT 271–3.

Qājār cause, Ishāq Khān maintained contact with Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā's opponents. In addition, he attempted to discredit the prince at the royal court in Tehran, intimating in several messages that the stalemate with the nobles of Khurāsān could only be overcome by the appointment of a new and capable governor. Not surprisingly, Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā seized the next opportunity when Ishāq Khān and his son Ḥusain Qulī Khān Qarā'ī, then governor in Turshīz, were present at the court in Mashhad to strangle them.¹²⁶

Ironically, the removal of his greatest rival did not improve Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā's situation. Unrest spread in Khurāsān, particularly in the regions contested between Mashhad and Herat. Once again, Ghūriyān slipped from Qājār control, and Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā's deputy Muḥammad Khān Qājār suffered two military setbacks. Defeated by an ad hoc coalition between Ishāq Khān's son Muḥammad Khān Qarā'ī and the Hazāra leadership, the Qājār general withdrew to Mashhad, thus enabling Fīrūz al-Dīn Sadūzai of Herat to spread his influence to Jām and Bākharz.¹²⁷ On receiving the news of the loss of Ghūriyān, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh realized that the relationship between Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā and the *khāns* of Khurāsān was beyond repair. He appointed another son, Ḥasan 'Alī Mīrzā, governor of Khurāsān and awarded the title of Shujā' al-Saltāna to him. Equipped with an army of 10,000 men, the new governor set out to restore order in the province.¹²⁸

THE GOVERNMENT OF ḤASAN 'ALĪ MĪRZĀ SHUJĀ' AL-SALTĀNA¹²⁹
(MUḤARRAM 1232–JUMĀDĀ II 1242/DECEMBER 1816–JANUARY 1827)¹³⁰

Shujā' al-Saltāna's ten-year tenure as governor coincided with the end of Sadūzai power in Kābul, which was sparked by Shāh Maḥmūd's abortive attempt to assume direct authority over Herat and eventually reduced his sphere of authority to western Afghanistan. The Qājār governor, on his part, attempted to establish a sufficient measure of control among the leadership of Khurāsān to mount a total of four campaigns against Herat in 1817, 1818, 1821 and 1826. Closer to Mashhad, Shujā' al-Saltāna's most important antagonists were Rizā Qulī Khān Za'farānlū of Khabūshān, Muḥammad Khān Qarā'ī of Turbat-i Ḥaidariya and Bunyād Khān Hazāra of Jām and Bākharz.

The first year of Shujā' al-Saltāna's governorship was characterized by intense military activity in the northern and eastern regions of Qājār Khurāsān. In Jumādā I 1232/March 1817, he moved against Khabūshān and thus forcefully convinced Rizā Qulī Khān Za'farānlū to join his ranks. Furthermore, the leadership of Bujnūrd, Darra Gaz, Jahān-Arghiyān and Rādkān undertook to give hostages and to furnish 2,000 cavalry to the Qājār governor. In Jumādā II 1232/May 1817, Shujā' al-Saltāna set out for Ghūriyān and Herat. During this campaign, he regained control of Ghūriyān and enforced allegiance from the Herati ruler Fīrūz al-Dīn Sadūzai, who submitted a tribute of 50,000 *tūmān* in gold and undertook to perform *sikka* and *khuṭba* in the name of Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh.¹³¹ This campaign was simultaneously directed against the Hazāras of Jām and Bākharz.¹³² On his way to Herat, Shujā' al-Saltāna forced Bunyād Khān Hazāra to flee from Jām,

¹²⁶ *Dhū al-qarnain* 424–5; NT 273–4; TMN 1530. See also *Riyāz al-siyāḥat* 226–7; Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 27.

¹²⁷ NT 275; KR 63–4 (Patterson 1988: 24).

¹²⁸ *Dhū al-qarnain* 426–9; NT 276. See also *Riyāz al-siyāḥat* 227; Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 28.

¹²⁹ Ḥasan 'Alī Mīrzā was the sixth son of Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh (Bāmdād 1992 I: 367).

¹³⁰ Shujā' al-Saltāna arrived in Mashhad on 17 Muḥarram 1232/7 December 1816 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 430; TRSN IX: 529). See also Komaki 1995: 88.

¹³¹ *Dhū al-qarnain* 443–9; NT 282–4. As the revenue of Ghūriyān amounted to 50,000 *tūmān* (Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 38), it is possible that the sum submitted by Ḥājji Fīrūz al-Dīn represented back revenues from Ghūriyān rather than a direct revenue payment by Herat.

¹³² In the early nineteenth century, as Bākharz and Jām were contested between the rulers of Herat and the Qājār governors of Mashhad, a number of Hazāra leaders, all descendants of Muḥammad Shāh Khān Hazāra Bēglerbēgī, came to the fore. In 1229/1814, Ibrāhīm Khān Hazāra b. Muḥammad Shāh encouraged Ḥājji Fīrūz al-Dīn of Herat to occupy Ghūriyān (*Dhū al-qarnain* 392, NT 256; ST 88; KR 63). As a result, he was detained during a visit to Tehran in Muḥarram 1230/January 1815. At that time, his nephew, Āzād b. Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī, gained the governorship of the Hazāras (*ḥukmrānī-yi qabāyil-i Hazāra*) but died soon afterwards (NT 265). In 1231/1816, Muḥammad Valī Mīrzā appointed Iskandar b. Āqā'ī to the government of Jām and the command of the Hazāras (*vilāyat-i Jām va imārat-i Hazārajāt*) (*Dhū al-qarnain* 427). In the same

and the Qājār troops killed so many Hazāras that they were able to erect a minaret of skulls. After the successful completion of the siege of Herat, Shujā' al-Saltāna decided to pursue Bunyād Khān further in the difficult terrain of Bādghīs, thus allowing himself to be drawn into a local power struggle among the leadership of the Hazāras, Tīmūrīs and Jamshīdīs. A military stand off near Darra-yi Būm¹³³ in the summer of 1232/1817 ended with a disorderly retreat of the Qājār troops.¹³⁴

Shujā' al-Saltāna's second campaign to Herat was occasioned by the continued competition for the possession of Ghūriyān. This rivalry gained scope as Fīrūz al-Dīn requested aid from Shāh Maḥmūd Sadūzai in Kābul against the Qājār governor. Ironically, Fīrūz al-Dīn found himself eliminated from the political arena by Shāh Maḥmūd's *vazīr* Faṭḥ Khān Muḥammadzai Bārakzai. After his successful coup against Fīrūz al-Dīn, Faṭḥ Khān installed himself in Herat, sent his half brother Kuhandil Khān against Ghūriyān, and entered coalitions with the Hazāra and Qarā'ī leadership and Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān of Khīva.¹³⁵ During the ensuing confrontation near Kāfir Qal'a in 1233/1818,¹³⁶ Shujā' al-Saltāna's troops were vastly outnumbered by those of Faṭḥ Khān.¹³⁷ The outcome of the battle was inconclusive. According to one British account, "both armies ran away from each other, and were both plundered by the Hazaurehs, each general took credit for a victory".¹³⁸ While offering different interpretations, the chroniclers on both sides agree that the bullet wound that Faṭḥ Khān Muḥammadzai received in his mouth had a grave psychological impact on the Afghan side. The sight of their wounded leader "made the bird of courage to fly from the case of the body", as the Afghan historian Faiẓ Muḥammad put it, and caused his officers to give up the fight.¹³⁹ Borne away by the "tide of retreat", Faṭḥ Khān was forced to return to Herat.¹⁴⁰

Shujā' al-Saltāna's position in Khurāsān was strengthened in the aftermath of the battle of Kāfir Qal'a. Faṭḥ Khān's erstwhile allies, Muḥammad Khān Qarā'ī, Qilich Khān Tīmūrī and Yalangtūsh I Jamshīdī submitted to the Qājār governor, thus enforcing the notion of an Iranian victory.¹⁴¹ Bunyād Khān Hazāra, on

year, during the final phase of Muḥammad Valī's government, Iskandar Khān and his uncles Bunyād Khān and Naṣīr Khān b. Muḥammad Shāh sided with Hājji Fīrūz al-Dīn Sadūzai. Their victory over the Qājār army enabled Fīrūz al-Dīn to expand his sphere of influence to include Ghūriyān, Jām and Bākharz (*Dhū al-qarnain* 428–9). At the time of his appointment as governor, Shujā' al-Saltāna allowed Ibrāhīm Khān Hazāra to return to Khurāsān. In the course of the military campaign of 1817, Shujā' al-Saltāna displaced Bunyād Khān and Naṣīr Khān Hazāra from the fort of Maḥmūdābād in Jām in 1817 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 430–1, 442–6, 449). Even so, Bunyād Khān continued to make his presence felt in the region until 1821.

¹³³ The Darra-yi Būm is the lower portion of a "long valley descending north from the northern watershed of the Hari Rud to the Murghab... The ... valley varies from 100 to 300 yards in breadth. It is bounded on either side by precipitous rocky cliffs, rising to a height of about 300 feet." (*Gaz. Afghanistan* III: 144; see also *Gaz. Afghanistan* III: 56). According to Faẓlullāh Shīrāzī, the "Darra-yi Bām" was a dependency of Mārūchāq and was located on the road from Qal'a-yi Nau to Bālā Murghāb at a distance of five *farsakh* from the Murghāb river (*Dhū al-qarnain* 449–52).

¹³⁴ Shujā' al-Saltāna returned from Bādghīs to Mashhad on 10 Ramaẓān 1232/24 July 1817 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 453; NT 286). See also KR 64 (Patterson 1988: 25–7); ST 91–2; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 149–50.

¹³⁵ NT 292–3, 295; KR 64–5 (Patterson 1988: 27–8); ST 92–3; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 151–2. See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 370.

¹³⁶ The Iranian sources do not mention the date of the battle at Kāfir Qal'a. Faẓlullāh Shīrāzī and Hidāyat merely state that Shujā' al-Saltāna set out from Mashhad on 8 Rajab 1233/14 May 1818 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 479; TRSN IX: 560). According to the *Tārīkh-i sulṭānī* and *Sirāj al-tavārīkh*, Faṭḥ Khān left Herat as late as 28 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1233/29 October 1818 to confront the Qājār troops (T Su 199; ST 95–6; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 156).

¹³⁷ While the exact figures vary, all sources agree that Faṭḥ Khān's army amounted to more than twice the number of that of Shujā' al-Saltāna. According to Fraser, Faṭḥ Khān was joined by 10,000 "disaffected Khurasanees". Shujā' al-Saltāna, on the other hand, commanded an army of 6,000 men but was at an advantage in terms of artillery (Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 34). Hidāyat reports that Faṭḥ Khān assembled 30–40,000 soldiers, whereas Shujā' al-Saltāna's army consisted of 10,000 cavalry and infantry (TRSN IX: 560). The authors of *Dhū al-qarnain*, *Nāsikh al-tavārīkh* and *Sirāj al-tavārīkh* speak of 30,000 men on Faṭḥ Khān's and 10,000 men on Shujā' al-Saltāna's side (*Dhū al-qarnain* 480; NT 296; ST 95; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 156). Riyāzī reports similar proportions, assigning 35,000 men to Faṭḥ Khān's side and 10,000 to Shujā' al-Saltāna's army (KR 66 (Patterson 1988: 34–5)).

¹³⁸ Conolly & Trevelyan 1831.

¹³⁹ ST 96. See also McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 158; *Dhū al-qarnain* 482; TRSN IX: 563; NT 298–9; TMN 1539; KR 66 (Patterson 1988: 34).

¹⁴⁰ Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 35.

¹⁴¹ ST 96; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 158.

his part, had brought the influential Qājār official Mīrzā ‘Abd al-Vahhāb Mu‘tamad al-Dawla (d. 1244/1829) into his control during the confusion of the fight and used him as a pawn to obtain assurances for the government of Ghūriyān, Kūsūya and Bākharz.¹⁴² Qājār claims to Khurāsān received a further boost with Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s campaign to the region in Ramazān—Dhū al-Ḥijja 1233/July–October 1818. On his way to Mashhad, the Qājār king exerted pressure on Khabūshān and used his influence with the Sadūzai court to have Fath Khān Muḥammadzai punished for interfering with the affairs of Ghūriyān, Bākharz and Turbat-i Ḥaidariya. When Shāh Maḥmūd’s son Kāmran Sadūzai attempted to mend the relationship with the Qājār court by alleging that the minister had acted without the consent of the Sadūzai government, Fath ‘Alī Shāh responded by asking Kāmran to demonstrate his goodwill by handing over Fath Khān as prisoner or blinding him. Kāmran chose the second course of action.¹⁴³

With the blinding and subsequent execution of Fath Khān, Afghanistan was plunged into an internal war that eventually led to the rise of the Muḥammadzais as rulers of Kābul and Qandahār. In this process, Shāh Maḥmūd and his son Kāmran, the last representatives of the Sadūzai empire, found their sphere of influence reduced to Herat. Meanwhile, in Iranian Khurāsān, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna used the unsettled state of affairs in the east to exert further pressure on the Qarā’i and Hazāra leadership. In the summer of 1235/1820, he forced his entry into Turbat-i Ḥaidariya but subsequently defused the conflict by entering a marriage alliance with Muḥammad Khān Qarā’i and reinstituting him as governor of the region.¹⁴⁴ Bunyād Khān Hazāra’s bid for the government of Ghūriyān, Kūsūya and Bākharz apparently met with no success. In 1235/1820 and 1236/1821, the Hazāra leader repeatedly plundered the regions of Bākharz and Jām, eliciting military responses from Shujā‘ al-Saltāna. In the battle of Kārīz on 24 Ramazān 1236/25 June 1821 Bunyād Khān suffered a decisive defeat and, finding himself pursued by Qājār troops, fled to Jamshīdī and Fīrūzkūhī country.¹⁴⁵ Shujā‘ al-Saltāna also used this campaign to eastern Khurāsān to make his presence felt in Herat. Unlike the previous year, however, he did not content himself with Shāh Maḥmūd’s protestations of loyalty but sent his *vazīr* Mīrzā Mūsā Gīlānī into the city to obtain “taxes” (*kharāj*) worth 10,000 *tūmān* and a “present” (*pīshkash*) of 100 bolts of cashmere shawl cloth.¹⁴⁶

Five years later, in early Dhū al-Ḥijja 1241/July 1826, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna once again set out for Ghūriyān and Herat, this time by the invitation of Kāmran Sadūzai, who sought Qājār assistance in his power struggle with his father Shāh Maḥmūd. Earlier during the year, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna had already deputed 500 cavalry to Herat. This had done little to improve Kāmran’s position vis-à-vis his father, who besieged the citadel of Herat with more than 4,000 troops. But the news of the approaching Qājār army in summer 1826 turned the tables in favor of Kāmran, who was able to inflict a decisive defeat on Shāh Maḥmūd without any active interference on the part of Shujā‘ al-Saltāna. Subsequently, Kāmran and his nobles invited the Qājār prince into the city and presented the keys of the city and the citadel to him. While collecting no revenue other than a carnelian ring from Kāmran’s treasury, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna used this opportunity to gain a more lasting

¹⁴² Fraser 1825 Appendix B: 35; *Dhū al-qarnain* 483–4; TRSN IX: 563–4; NT 300; ST 96; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 158. See also Javadi, “‘Abd al-Vahhāb Mo‘tamad al-Dawla ‘Nashāt,’” *E.Ir.* I: 170–1.

¹⁴³ *Dhū al-qarnain* 488–98; NT 296–306; ST 97; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 158–9.

¹⁴⁴ *Dhū al-qarnain* 516–7; NT 316. See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 372–3.

¹⁴⁵ *Dhū al-qarnain* 516, 528–9; NT 316–17, 322. The battle of Kārīz sealed Bunyād Khān’s fate. Already one year before, in 1235/1819–20, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna had entrusted Qilich Khān Tīmūrī with the administration (*naẓm*) of Khvāf and Bākharz (*Dhū al-qarnain* 515–17). After the battle of Kārīz, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna appointed Bunyād Khān’s brother Ibrāhīm Khān Hazāra as governor of Bākharz and Shahr-i Nau (*Dhū al-qarnain* 528–9; NT 322–3). At the time of Aḥmad ‘Alī Mīrzā’s appointment as governor of Khurāsān in Ṣafar 1245/August 1829, Bahrām b. Bunyād Khān Hazāra (d. 1245/1829–30) was the *bēglerbēgī* of Jām and Bākharz (*Dhū al-qarnain* 719, 766). In 1248/1832, ‘Abbās Mīrzā Nā’ib al-Saltāna awarded the government of Turbat-i Ḥaidariya, B-R-S-N, Kadkan, Maḥvilāt and Sar-i Jām to Suhrāb Khān Ghulām Pīshkhiḍmatbāshī and made Ibrāhīm Khān Hazāra second in command (*niyābat*) in some of these regions (NT 487).

¹⁴⁶ *Dhū al-qarnain* 529; NT 323. KR 67–8 (Patterson 1988: 38–9); see also ST 105. In 1238/1822–23, Shujā‘ al-Saltāna was recalled to Fārs but was reappointed to the governorship of Khurāsān the following year. During his absence from Khurāsān, his younger brother ‘Alī Naqī Mīrzā Ḥujjat al-Sultān acted as governor (*Dhū al-qarnain* 577, 592; TRSN IX: 620–1, 629). See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 374; Komaki 1995: 89; Mīr Niyā 1994: 49–50.

foothold in Herat. When he returned to Mashhad in early Muḥarram 1242/August 1826, he left his son Arghūn Mīrzā supported by 5,000 cavalry and three cannons behind.¹⁴⁷

The occupation of Herat in the summer of 1241–42/1826 marked the high point of Shujāʿ al-Saltāna's power in Khurāsān. Yet his territorial gains soon deteriorated after his recall to Tehran in Jumādā II–Rajab 1242/January 1827 and his subsequent appointment to Yazd and Kirmān.¹⁴⁸ Under the governorship of Shujāʿ al-Saltāna's son Hulākū Mīrzā, who was assisted by his brothers Arghūn Mīrzā (governor of Sabzavār) and Mangū Qāʾān (governor of Turshīz), it took less than three months to undo Shujāʿ al-Saltāna's achievements. After Hulākū's inconclusive campaign against Muḥammad Khān Qarāʾī of Turbat-i Ḥaidariya in Ramaẓān 1243/April 1828, Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū seized the reins of government, formally designating Hulākū's younger brother Abāqā Khān Mīrzā as new governor of Khurāsān. During the next year, Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū and Muḥammad Khān Qarāʾī carved out separate bases of power for themselves. By Ṣafar 1244/August 1828, Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū controlled not only the Kurdish regions of Khabūshān, Chinārān and Rādkān but also Nīshāpūr. Muḥammad Khān Qarāʾī, on the other hand, initially sided with the Qājār general Ḥusain Khān Qājār Qazvīnī in a military campaign against Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū in Nīshāpūr but then used the trust placed in him to take control of the city of Mashhad. This provided the opportunity for Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū to ingratiate himself with the Qājār government by asking for the appointment of a new governor to Khurāsān.¹⁴⁹

THE GOVERNMENT OF AḤMAD ʿALĪ MĪRZĀ¹⁵⁰
(RAJAB 1245–RAJAB 1247/JANUARY 1830–DECEMBER 1831)¹⁵¹

The affairs of Khurāsān unfolded according to Rizā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū's plans. The newly appointed governor Aḥmad ʿAlī Mīrzā arrived in Chinārān on 12 Rabīʿ II 1245/11 October 1829, where Rizā Qulī Khān submitted the control of Nīshāpūr to him.¹⁵² Subsequently, Aḥmad ʿAlī Mīrzā moved against Mashhad with the assistance of the Zaʿfarānlū and Shādillū Kurds, as well as the Jalāyir, Hazāra and Tīmūrī leadership. Faced with the approach of 20,000 troops, Muḥammad Khān Qarāʾī realized that the “doors of misfortune had opened on him from all sides” and decided to withdraw to Turbat-i Ḥaidariya. Aḥmad ʿAlī Mīrzā entered Mashhad on 7 Rajab 1245/1 January 1830.¹⁵³ The remainder of his governorship was devoted to maintaining order in the regions located north of Mashhad known as Pusht-i Kūh. Located on the fringes of the plains of Khvārazm, the Jalāyir leadership of Kalāt and the Chāpushlū leadership of Darra Gaz in particular attempted to use the relative weakness of the Qājār presence in Mashhad to open negotiations with the Khān of Khīva.¹⁵⁴ Aḥmad ʿAlī Mīrzā depended for his exercise of power entirely on his experienced *vazīr* Mīrzā Mūsā Gīlānī, who had already served under Ḥasan ʿAlī Mīrzā Shujāʿ al-Saltāna.¹⁵⁵ Conolly, who met the governor of Khurāsān in the summer of 1830, described him as “a mere pageant”.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁷ *Dhū al-qarnain* 631–2; NT 375; KR 68–9 (Patterson 1988: 40–42), T Su 282. See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 374. *Kulliyāt-i Riyāzī* also reports an earlier meeting between Kāmran Sadūzai and Shujāʿ al-Saltāna in 1241/late summer 1825, during which a treaty of friendship was concluded (KR 68–9 (Patterson 1988: 40–1)).

¹⁴⁸ Bāmdād 1992 I: 375–5; Raḡavī 1999: 205.

¹⁴⁹ *Dhū al-qarnain* 693–5, 717–18. See also NT 414–16, 427–8; Raḡavī 1999: 205–6; Shākīrī 1986: 61; Komaki 1995: 91.

¹⁵⁰ Aḥmad ʿAlī Mīrzā was the nineteenth son of Faṭḥ ʿAlī Shāh (Bāmdād 1992 I: 93; Shākīrī 1986, 60).

¹⁵¹ According to *Dhū al-qarnain*, Aḥmad ʿAlī left Tehran for Khurāsān on 3 Ṣafar 1245/4 August 1829 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 718–19).

¹⁵² *Dhū al-qarnain* 719.

¹⁵³ NT 429. See also *Dhū al-qarnain* 720, 781; Raḡavī 1999: 206; Komaki 1995: 91.

¹⁵⁴ NT 442, 451.

¹⁵⁵ *Dhū al-qarnain* 719, 797, 841.

¹⁵⁶ Conolly 1834 I: 285, 287.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ‘ABBĀS MĪRZĀ NĀ’IB AL-SALTĀNA
(RAJAB 1247–JUMĀDĀ II 1249/DECEMBER 1831–OCTOBER 1833)¹⁵⁷

The unsettled state of affairs in Khurāsān caused Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh to add the governorship of Khurāsān to Nā’ib al-Saltāna’s duties in Azerbaijan. In late 1831, he assigned the command of the eastern territories “up to the river Oxus and the waters of the Atrak” to the heir apparent.¹⁵⁸ Nā’ib al-Saltāna arrived in Mashhad on 17 Rajab 1247/22 December 1831.¹⁵⁹ Supported by military regiments from Azerbaijan, Māzandarān, and Astarābād, Nā’ib al-Saltāna decisively altered the balance of power in the summer and fall of 1248/1832.¹⁶⁰ At the end of his forceful campaigns against Khabūshān, Sarakhs and Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya, Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū and Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī found themselves imprisoned and deported to Azerbaijan, and their dominions were incorporated into the Qājār administration. Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū was forced to submit on 8 Rabī‘ II 1248/4 September 1832. Nā’ib al-Saltāna ordered the fort of Khabūshān to be razed and awarded it along with the *sar vilāyat* of Nīshāpūr, Bām and parts of Jahān-Arghiyān to his relative Nūr Muḥammad Khān Develū.¹⁶¹ On 23–24 Jumādā I 1248/18–19 October 1832, the Qājār troops took possession of Sarakhs, plundered the town and razed the citadel.¹⁶² On his way back from Sarakhs, Nā’ib al-Saltāna deprived Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī of his dependencies of Maḥmūdābād, Daulatābād, Zāva and Sangān. Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī seemed on his way to an amicable arrangement with the Qājār governor, when Nā’ib al-Saltāna decided to imprison him on the basis of his purported correspondence with Kāmran Sadūzai in Herat. The government of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya was awarded to a tribal outsider, Suhrāb Khān Ghulām Pīshkhidmatbāshī.¹⁶³ On the occasion of his visit to the royal court in Muḥarram 1249/June 1833, Nā’ib al-Saltāna presented the Za‘farānlū and Qarā’ī leaders to Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh. Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū and Muḥammad Khān Qarā’ī were exiled to Azerbaijan, but Rizā Qulī Khān died en route to Tabrīz.¹⁶⁴

Nā’ib al-Saltāna’s governorship of Khurāsān was also characterized by mounting tensions with Kāmran Sadūzai, who had become the undisputed ruler of Herat after Shujā‘ al-Saltāna’s intervention on his behalf in 1826.¹⁶⁵ Kāmran’s advisor Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai had been an important player in the upheaval that broke out in Khurāsān after Shujā‘ al-Saltāna’s recall to Tehran in January 1827.¹⁶⁶ Closely allied with Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū, he attempted in vain to discourage Nā’ib al-Saltāna from taking action against Khabūshān. Little moved by Yār Muḥammad Khān’s threat that he was about to join forces with Rizā Qulī Khān Za‘farānlū, Nā’ib al-Saltāna peremptorily ordered his attendance at his camp. Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai complied and was immediately placed under arrest.¹⁶⁷ Subsequent to the conquest of Khabūshān and Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya, Nā’ib al-Saltāna turned to the affairs of Herat. In early 1833, he sent an ultimatum to Kāmran Sadūzai that he should give up Herat and present himself at the Qājār court or perform *sikka* and *khutba* in the name of the Iranian king, submit taxes (*manāl-i dīvān*) and give hostages. Instead, Kāmran

¹⁵⁷ NT 458, 502.

¹⁵⁸ *Ṭūlan tā rūd-i Jaiḥūn va ‘arzan tā āb-i Atrak* (*Dhū al-qarnain* 789). See also TRSN IX: 745; TMN 1606.

¹⁵⁹ *Dhū al-qarnain* 798; TRSN IX: 750; NT 458. See also TMN 1607; Komaki 1995: 93.

¹⁶⁰ Nā’ib al-Saltāna dismissed the Astarābādī troops under the command of their governor, the Qājār prince Badī‘ al-Zamān b. Muḥammad Qulī Mulk Ārā, after the conquest of Sarakhs in October 1832 (*Dhū al-qarnain* 832).

¹⁶¹ Nūr Muḥammad Khān Develū was the brother of the former Prime Minister Allāhyār Khān Āsaf al-Daula (*Dhū al-qarnain* 821–5; see also NT 482; KR 71 (Patterson 1988: 48–9)). The *sar vilāyat-i Nīshāpūr* was a subdivision of Nīshāpūr located northwest of the town (*Gaz. Iran* II: 529). In other contexts, the term *sar vilāyat* seems to refer to the “upper”, mountainous part of Khurāsān north of Sabzavār and Nīshāpūr, e.g., *sar vilāyat-i Buzunjird* [Bujnūrd] (TRSN X: 377); *sar vilāyat va Khabūshān* (TRSN X: 376); *Chinārān va sar vilāyat ki bihtarīn mavāzi ‘i kull-i Khurāsān ast* (*Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 298).

¹⁶² *Dhū al-qarnain* 828–31; NT 483–5.

¹⁶³ *Dhū al-qarnain* 832–5; NT 486–7. Suhrāb Khān Ghulām Pīshkhidmatbāshī was also appointed to the governorship of B-R-S-N, Kadkan (a subdivision of Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya), Maḥvilāt, and Sar-i Jām (a large plain southeast of Mashhad) (*Gaz. Iran* II: 250–1, 460–1, 596).

¹⁶⁴ NT 497–8. See also Fraser 1973: 225–7; Komaki 1995: 93–4; Shākirī 1986: 63.

¹⁶⁵ Champagne 1981: 100.

¹⁶⁶ NT 415.

¹⁶⁷ *Dhū al-qarnain* 836–7; NT 478, 480–1, 487. Mohan Lal met Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai in Mashhad in early October 1832 and in February 1833 (Lal 1977: 107–9, 112, 135).

offered a “present” (*pīshkash*) of 15,000 *tūmān* in gold coins and advised Nā’ib al-Saltāna to prepare for war if he insisted on more than the offered sum.¹⁶⁸

During his return from Tehran to Khurāsān in the late summer of 1249/1833, Nā’ib al-Saltāna ordered his son Muḥammad Mīrzā to move against Herat. Yet this campaign was cut short when Nā’ib al-Saltāna succumbed to tuberculosis in Mashhad on 10 Jumādā II 1249/25 October 1833.¹⁶⁹ Given the altered state of affairs in Khurāsān and the prospect of becoming heir apparent himself, Muḥammad Mīrzā gave up the siege of Herat. After his arrival in Mashhad in late Jumādā II 1249/November 1833, Muḥammad Mīrzā summoned Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai, still detained at the provincial court, and ordered him to work out a settlement concerning Herat. The resulting treaty stipulated that Kāmran Sadūzai should perform *sikka* and *khuṭba* in the name of the Iranian king, submit 15,000 *tūmān* and 50 bolts of cashmere cloth as *pīshkash*, and send in one of his sons as hostage.¹⁷⁰ While Nā’ib al-Saltāna’s governorship had a grave impact on the balance of power in the hinterland of Mashhad, the position of Herat was scarcely affected. Although the striking of coins and the recitation of the Friday prayer in the name of the Iranian king formally placed Herat within the orbit of Qājār control, the actual income derived there had decreased considerably as compared to Shujā’ al-Saltāna’s first campaign in 1817, and was negligible with regard to the revenue yielded by the provinces more firmly incorporated in the Qājār state.¹⁷¹

THE GOVERNMENT OF ALLĀHYĀR KHĀN ĀṢAF AL-DAULA QĀJĀR DEVELŪ (1250–1263/1834–1847)

Owing to British and Russian intervention, the power struggle which erupted after Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s death in Iṣfahān on 19 Jumādā II 1250/23 October 1834¹⁷² was quickly settled. Muḥammad Mīrzā was proclaimed king in Tabriz on 7 Rajab 1250/9 November 1834.¹⁷³ The king appointed Mīrzā Abū al-Qāsim Qā’im Maqām Prime Minister in gratitude for his unwavering support for his quest for power. In choosing Mīrzā Abū al-Qāsim as Prime Minister, Muḥammad Shāh Qājār dashed the hopes of his maternal uncle and former Prime Minister Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula Qājār Develū of regaining this post.¹⁷⁴ Unable to hide his disappointment, Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula resisted the appointment as governor of Fārs and was eventually made governor of Khurāsān. His tenure there coincided approximately with Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s reign (1834–1848). Upon Abū al-Qāsim Qā’im Maqām’s execution on 29 Ṣafar 1251/26 June 1835, Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula briefly attempted to regain a central role in the capital but returned to Khurāsān when the king chose his tutor Ḥājji Mīrzā Āqāsī as chief advisor.¹⁷⁵ His frustrated ambitions in the capital notwithstanding, Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula enjoyed an extremely powerful position in Khurāsān.

Having attained kingship, Muḥammad Shāh Qājār resumed the activities his father had begun in Khurāsān in 1831. After the loss of Yerevan and Nakhjivān to the Russians had been sealed with the treaty of Turkmānchāy in 1828, a firm stand in the eastern part of the Qājār kingdom seemed all the more important. In Rabī’ II 1252/July 1836, Muḥammad Shāh embarked on his first eastward campaign but concentrated on subduing the Teke, Yomut and Göklen Turkmens after being informed that cholera was

¹⁶⁸ *Dhū al-qarnain* 862; NT 488, 496–7. See also Ferrier 1858: 175–6.

¹⁶⁹ Nā’ib al-Saltāna was buried at Imām Rīzā’s shrine (*Dhū al-qarnain* 881; TRSN X: 61f; NT 500–502; T Su 283; Busse 1972: 222).

¹⁷⁰ *Dhū al-qarnain* 885. See also NT 504. According to Riyāzī, Muḥammad Mīrzā stationed Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū in Herat (KR 71–2 (Patterson 1988: 50)).

¹⁷¹ According to Fraser, Iraq, Gīlān and Fārs yielded 500,000 *tūmān*, 160,000 *tūmān* and 150,000 *tūmān* respectively to the royal treasury (Fraser 1825: 217–18).

¹⁷² TRSN X: 94; NT 518; TMN 1621; KR 72 (Patterson 1988: 52); Busse 1972: 229.

¹⁷³ TRSN X: 144; NT 609. Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s official coronation in Tehran took place on 14 Ramaḥān 1250/14 January 1835 (TRSN X: 151; TMN 1630).

¹⁷⁴ Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula was married to Maryam Khānum, Fath ‘Alī Shāh’s fifth daughter. His sister was married to ‘Abbās Mīrzā Nā’ib al-Saltāna. He served Fath ‘Alī Shāh as majordomo (*khvānsālār*) and held the post of prime minister from 1240–1243/1824–1827 (NT 413; TMN 1566, 1593; see also Bāmdād 1992 I: 154).

¹⁷⁵ TRSN X: 162–5; NT 629–30, 656; TMN 1632; Mostofi 1997: 40. See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 63 Yapp 1980: 123; Zarrinkoob, “Qā’im Maqām-i Farāhānī,” *E.I.*, 2 IV: 462.

rampant around Mashhad.¹⁷⁶ The following summer, Muḥammad Shāh again set out for Khurāsān, and marched from Mashhad for Ghūriyān and Herat. While Ghūriyān fell to the Iranian army after two days on 14 Sha‘bān 1253/13 November 1837, the siege of Herat lasted for ten months, from 21 November 1837 to 9 September 1838.¹⁷⁷ During this period, the Iranian army of 30,000 men and 90,000 camp followers achieved little except denuding the valley of Herat of provisions. The main feature of Iranian strategy was a barrage of artillery fire, the efficiency of which was subject to varying interpretations. According to idealizing Iranian accounts, the bombardment was so dense that not even a crow or pigeon dared to alight on the outer fortifications of the city.¹⁷⁸ While attesting to the intensity of the Iranian fire, British accounts questioned its accuracy and claimed that thousands of rounds of ammunition were wasted during the early stages of the siege.¹⁷⁹ Military progress was not encumbered merely by rivalries among the various Iranian commanders but also Prime Minister Ḥājī Mīrzā Āqāsī’s decision to block only two of Herat’s five gates during the first two months after the Iranian army had taken position.¹⁸⁰

Meanwhile, the real fight took place near Bālā Murghāb northeast of Herat. From the fall of 1837 until early March 1838, Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula, his nephew Iskandar Khān Qājār Develū and approximately 16,000 troops were locked into repeated battles with the leadership of the Jamshīdī, Hazāra and Fīrūzkūhī leadership. The confrontations reached their climax on 20 December 1837. While greatly outnumbered by the combined northern forces of 20,000 cavalry, the Iranian artillery carried the day and caused Mīzrāb Khān of Maimana as well as the Jamshīdī and Hazāra leadership to tender their submission.¹⁸¹

Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s move against Herat reawakened British fears that growing Russian influence in Iran might destabilize British India’s northwestern possessions. As early as 1831, Nā‘ib al-Saltāna’s activities in Khurāsān had caused concern that Iran might become the “vehicle” for Russian interests. It was also during this time that Herat was identified as a vital strategic point for the defence of British possessions. The perception of Herat as the “key of India”¹⁸² acquired renewed stringency as Muḥammad Shāh displayed a marked determination not to content himself with the customary pledges of fealty on the part of the lords of Herat and settled in for a prolonged siege. In April 1838, the British envoy McNeill joined the Shāh’s camp before Herat and offered to mediate between the Iranians and Kāmran Sadūzai. The Iranian accounts characterize McNeill’s endeavors for peace as a poorly veiled attempt to strengthen the cause of Herat. According to this version of events, McNeill entered Herat twice and, instead of negotiating peace, offered financial and moral support to Kāmran Sadūzai and his minister.¹⁸³ McNeill, on his part, attributed the failure of the negotiations on 19 and 20 April to the Shah’s insistence on the recognition of Iranian suzerainty. Furthermore, Kāmran Sadūzai seems to have raised his stakes impossibly high by demanding the evacuation of Ghūriyān. The negotiations taking place a week later were killed by Iranian demands for a large indemnity from Herat. Unable to convince Muḥammad Shāh Qājār to give up the siege, McNeill broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and left the Shah’s camp on 3 June.¹⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the Heratis profited from the presence of Eldred Pottinger (1811–1843), a young British officer of the Bombay artillery, who happened to be in the city at the onset of the Qājār siege and actively promoted the defence of the city by advances of money and practical assistance.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁶ NT 657–60; TMN 1635–6; Busse 1972: 251; Yapp 1980: 138–9.

¹⁷⁷ TRSN X: 658; NT 676–7; Stoddart to McNeill, Shah’s camp before Herat, 10 December 1837, 9 September 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A/7/1, Enclosure 1 No. 69, p. 90; Appendix p. 69).

¹⁷⁸ NT 711.

¹⁷⁹ Pottinger in Sykes 1981 I: 408; Yapp 1980: 145.

¹⁸⁰ NT 681–2; ST 132; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 221.

¹⁸¹ TRSN X: 58, 60, 212–16; NT 682–692; TMN 1642; ST 132–135; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 I: 222–6; Lee 1996: 149–58; McNeill to Palmerston, Tehran, 23 February 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A/7/1 No. 73, p. 95).

¹⁸² Yapp 1980: 116.

¹⁸³ NT 706, 708, 712; Memorandum addressed by the King of Persia to the Courts of England, France, Russia, and Turkey from the Camp before Herat, 15 Rabī‘ I 1254/7 July 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A/1, Enclosure 2 in No. 105, pp. 188–9). See also Busse 1972: 256.

¹⁸⁴ Yapp 1980: 146, 148.

¹⁸⁵ Yapp 1980: 361.

McNeill's fears of growing Russian influence were kindled by the arrival of the Russian ambassador Count Simonich at the time of his first negotiations with Herat. While Simonich claimed to be searching for a battalion of Russian deserters serving in the Iranian army, McNeill suspected active Russian intervention to be at hand. In fact, Simonich had initially assumed a neutral position when Muḥammad Shāh Qājār vented his plans of a campaign against Herat in May 1837. Yet after his arrival in the Iranian camp, the Russian ambassador gradually took on a more active role. In early May, he guaranteed an Iranian alliance with Qandahār. Financial support for the siege followed, and when the Shāh decided to force the Herat issue by a massive assault on June 24, 1838, he did so with the active support of Russian officers.¹⁸⁶ Yet after six days of battle the Shah's army was repulsed with considerable loss.¹⁸⁷

Meanwhile, 500 British troops occupied the Iranian island of Khārg. On August 11, McNeill's military secretary Stoddart reached the Iranian camp and submitted a note informing the king that the occupation of Khārg would continue until the siege of Herat was lifted and the Prime Minister tendered a formal apology for the mistreatment of a messenger in British employ. Muḥammad Shāh Qājār consented to the demands of the British government and lifted the siege of Herat on 19 Jumādā II 1254/September 9, 1838.¹⁸⁸ In the light of a treaty concluded with Qandahār in November 1837,¹⁸⁹ the Qājār court managed to put a favorable gloss on the impact of the Herat campaign:

His Majesty, the Shah, with reference to the state of His kingdom, considered it expedient to return after having spent seventeen months in a campaign, and suffered the loss entailed by the expenses of an army of sixty thousand men, and after having subdued the whole of Affghanistan [sic], except for the four walls of Herat... We have left in Ghorian, which forms part of the district of Toorbut [Turbat-i Ḥaidariya?], and was lately in possession of Herat, two thousand men and four guns...¹⁹⁰

In the aftermath of the war, combined British and Russian pressure forced Iran to evacuate Ghūriyān as well. All the same, Muḥammad Shāh Qājār sought to soften the blow he had received at Herat and represented his campaign as a success in settling the eastern borders of Iran. While lacking the financial means for additional military adventures, the Shah did not give up his historical claims to Herat. The lords of Herat, on their part, were willing to return to the *status quo ante* in their relationship with the Iranian government. After the withdrawal of the British mission from Herat in February 1841, both Kāmrān Sadūzai and his minister Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai renewed their previous pledges of allegiance to the Qājār rulers. In a letter to Muḥammad Shāh Qājār, Kāmrān formally acknowledged Herat to be part of Khurāsān, and by extension, of the Iranian state: "It is obvious that Herat is a part of Khurāsān... and that the king has left this realm (*mulk*) at our disposal. I hereby attest to the fact that Herat is connected with Iran."¹⁹¹ This formal protestation of loyalty notwithstanding, the evacuation of Ghūriyān on 31 March 1841 helped to disentangle Qājār and Herati interests.¹⁹²

Qājār control of Khurāsān remained stable until Ramaẓān 1261/September 1845, when Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's deteriorating physical condition gave rise to a power struggle at court which also made itself felt in the province. One faction gathered around Prime Minister Ḥājji Mīrzā Āqāsī's step son Allāh Qulī Mīrzā, whose mother was a daughter of Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh. After his removal from the capital in December 1845, Allāh Qulī Mīrzā attempted to use the revenues of his domain in Burūjird to advance separate claims of power. This rebellion never got off the ground as a network of informers reported every of his moves to the capital. When Allāh Qulī Mīrzā attempted to return to Tehran in Rabī' I 1263/March 1847, Muḥammad Shāh Qājār

¹⁸⁶ Yapp 1980: 142, 146–8.

¹⁸⁷ McNeill to Palmerston, camp near Tehran, 31 July 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1 No. 95, p. 158).

¹⁸⁸ Busse 1972: 260; Kelly 1991: 299; Sykes 1981 I: 411; McNeill to Palmerston, camp near Tehran, 31 July, 3 August 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1 No. 95, p. 159–60).

¹⁸⁹ Mullā 'Abd al-Rashīd (chief manager to Kuhandil Khān) to Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1, Enclosure 22 in No. 81, p. 137).

¹⁹⁰ The Persian Foreign Minister to Count Nesselrode, royal camp at Simnān, 1 November 1838 (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1, Enclosure 3 in No. 105, p. 190).

¹⁹¹ Kāmrān Sadūzai to Muḥammad Shāh Qājār, 15 May 1841, quoted in Ittiḥādīya 1975 (125): 34.

¹⁹² Ittiḥādīya 1975 (125): 31, 34–5.

prohibited his entry into the capital and strongly suggested he visit the Shiite shrine cities (*‘atabāt*) of Najaf, Karbalā’, Kāzimain, and Sāmarrā’.¹⁹³

A second, even more powerful faction formed around three sons of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s maternal uncle Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula, who was married to a daughter of Fath ‘Alī Shāh and was locked into a bitter competition with Ḥājji Mīrzā Āqāsī.¹⁹⁴ Among Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula’s sons, Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān Sālār played an important role in the administration of Khurāsān.¹⁹⁵ The second son, Muḥammad Qulī Khān Ishīk Āqāsī was one of the numerous rivals of Ḥājji Mīrzā Āqāsī at the royal court in Tehran. The third son, Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī resided in Tehran and only assumed an active part in the affairs of Khurāsān from 1847 on. In 1262/1846, Muḥammad Qulī Khān Ishīk Āqāsī informed Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula of Muḥammad Shāh’s poor state of health and of the intensifying competition of various factions at the Qājār court. Āṣaf al-Daula used the apparent weakness at the center to carve out an independent position for himself in Khurāsān. With the death of Ḥājji Mīrzā Mūsā Khān, the *mutavallībāshī* of Imām Rizā’s shrine, Āṣaf al-Daula sensed the opportunity to appropriate the custodianship of the shrine for himself. Yet this plan was countermanded by Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s appointment of Ḥājji Mīrzā ‘Abdullāh Khū’ī to this post.¹⁹⁶

At this time, Ḥasan Khān Sālār began to advance separate claims to kingship and formed an alliance with his brother-in-law Ja‘far Qulī b. Najaf Qulī Khān Shādillū of Bujnūrd. Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula initially strengthened the incipient rebellion by ignoring royal decrees requesting Ja‘far Qulī Khān’s presence at court.¹⁹⁷ In 1263/1847, however, he began to fear that Ḥasan Khān Sālār was planning to avail himself of his treasury in order to raise additional troops. Arguing that these funds should be spent in Tehran to further the political cause of the family, Āṣaf al-Daula set out for the capital, taking 400,000 *tūmān* in gold coins with him and appointing his son Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī as his deputy in Mashhad. It is not clear whether Āṣaf al-Daula indeed planned to defy the Qājār government. When news arrived that Ḥasan Khān Sālār and Ja‘far Qulī Khān Shādillū had occupied Kalāt, Āṣaf al-Daula began to worry about his position at court and convinced his sister, the mother of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār, to travel to Mecca with him. After his visit to Mecca, he decided to reside in the *‘atabāt*, where he was joined by Muḥammad Qulī Khān Ishīk Āqāsī shortly after.¹⁹⁸

Meanwhile in Khurāsān, Ḥasan Khān Sālār’s rebellion took on a larger dimension, eliciting a major mobilization of Qājār troops under the leadership of Prince Ḥamza Mīrzā Ḥishmat al-Daula (1235–1297/1819–1880)¹⁹⁹ and his generals Ibrāhīm Khalīl Khān Khū’ī and Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān Mākū’ī.²⁰⁰ Despite several setbacks, the rebellion outlasted Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s reign. After suffering a major defeat near Bistām in Ramaẓān 1263/August 1847 and facing a rebellion of the population of Kalāt against the Shādillū occupation, Ḥasan Khān Sālār and Ja‘far Qulī Khān Shādillū withdrew to the territory of the Toqtamīsh Turkmens in Akhal. With Ḥamza Mīrzā’s entry into Mashhad and Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī b. Āṣaf al-Daula’s withdrawal into the shrine of Imām Rizā on 17 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1263/27 October 1847, the confrontation seemed to have been decided in favor of the royal court.²⁰¹ Even so, Ja‘far Qulī Khān was able to reoccupy his former stronghold Bujnūrd for a brief period when the local population rebelled against the exactions of the newly appointed Qājār governor Muḥammad ‘Alī Khān Mākū’ī. In the winter of 1264/1847–48, Ḥasan Khān Sālār moved to Sarakhs, wherefrom he made a vain attempt to solicit the support

¹⁹³ NT 843, 851–6, 864–7; TMN 1647–8, 1678.

¹⁹⁴ TRSN X: 307–8; Wolff 1848: 356.

¹⁹⁵ Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān Sālār was the fifth son of Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula (Bāmdād 1992 II: 479).

¹⁹⁶ TRSN X: 306, 308; TMN 1678; “Āṣaf al-Daula,” DM.

¹⁹⁷ NT 854, 860; TMN 1677–8.

¹⁹⁸ TRSN X: 308, 319; NT 869–74; TMN 1684–5; “Āṣaf al-Daula, Ḥāj Muḥammad Qulī Khān,” DM.

¹⁹⁹ TMN 2010. Ḥamza Mīrzā was the twenty-first son of ‘Abbās Mīrzā Nā’ib al-Saltāna and a full brother of Sulṭān Murād Mīrzā Ḥusām al-Saltāna (Bāmdād 1992 I: 462).

²⁰⁰ Ḥamza Mīrzā left Tehran on 8 Ramaẓān 1263/20 August 1847 (TRSN X: 324).

²⁰¹ TRSN X: 324–7; NT 875–84; TMN 1685–7.

of the Amīr of Bukhārā. Jaʿfar Qulī Khān Shādillū sought shelter with Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai in Herat.²⁰²

Ḥasan Khān Sālār's prospects improved dramatically in the fall of 1848 when the oppressive behavior of the royal troops in Mashhad and its environs prepared the ground for renewed unrest. Within the city, Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī, still residing in the shrine of Imām Riżā, used a temporary absence of Ḥamza Mīrzā to forge alliances with the local leadership. The active phase of the rebellion began on 25 Ramaẓān 1264/25 August 1848 when Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī and his ally Rajab Marvī put Ibrāhīm Sulṭān Dārūgha and the *mutavallibāshī* Ḥājji Mīrzā ʿAbdullāh Khūʿī to death. Some of the ulama of Mashhad supported this renewed challenge to Qājār authority and, citing the abuses committed by Ḥamza Mīrzā's Azerbaijani troops, declared jihad against him.²⁰³ Hearing of the altered state of affairs in Mashhad, Ḥasan Khān Sālār set out from Sarakhs accompanied by 2,000 Turkmen troops. As news of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's death on 5 Shavvāl 1264/4 September 1848²⁰⁴ spread in Khurāsān, the odds were turned even further against Ḥamza Mīrzā, who found himself besieged in the citadel of Mashhad and rapidly ran out of provisions.²⁰⁵ Interestingly, he ultimately was to benefit from a third party brought into the fray by Jaʿfar Qulī Khān Shādillū. Outwardly posing as a supporter of Ḥasan Khān Sālār, Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai of Herat appeared before Mashhad but entered an alliance with Ḥamza Mīrzā. Given the hopeless position of the royal troops in the citadel, the Qājār prince took up Yār Muḥammad Khān's proposition to spend the winter in Ghūriyān and withdrew from Mashhad after disabling all heavy artillery and burning the fortifications.²⁰⁶

In the windfall of Ḥamza Mīrzā's precipitate departure, Ḥasan Khān Sālār extended his sphere of influence to include the towns of Nīshāpūr,²⁰⁷ Sabzavār, Turshīz, Turbat-i Ḥaidariya,²⁰⁸ Qāyin,²⁰⁹ Bujnūrd, Jājarm and Isfarāyīn.²¹⁰ To underline his independent position in Khurāsān, he had coins struck in his own name.²¹¹ In the course of the winter of 1848–49, Ḥasan Khān Sālār's position proved relatively stable. When 7,000 royal troops advanced from Tehran shortly after Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's coronation on 22 Dhū al-Qaʿda 1264/20 October 1848,²¹² they were unable to accomplish much, owing to heavy snowfall and intense cold. Their leader Sulṭān Murād Mīrzā b. Nāʾib al-Salṭāna, who received the title Ḥusām al-Salṭāna at the end of the Khurāsān campaign, depended entirely on the support of Sām Khān Īlkhānī b. Riżā Qulī Khān Zaʿfarānlū of Khabūshān for the survival of his troops.²¹³ While Ḥasan Khān Sālār rejected all offers of negotiation, Jaʿfar Qulī Khān Shādillū gave up his role in the rebellion and left Khurāsān for Tehran on 1 Rabīʿ I 1265/25

²⁰² TRSN X: 328–31; NT 884–9; TMN 1688.

²⁰³ NT 972–5. See also TRSN X: 322–38; Khūrmūjī 1984: 45–7; TMN 1688–9.

²⁰⁴ TRSN X: 350–1; NT 920; TMN 1689; Lambton 1988b: 16.

²⁰⁵ TRSN X: 371–2; NT 975–77.

²⁰⁶ NT 978–80; See also TRSN X: 372–3, 385–6; T Su 286–7; Bāmdād 1992 I: 462. Ḥamza Mīrzā made camp near Ghūriyān from the middle of Muḥarram to the end of Rabīʿ II 1265/middle of December 1848 to late March 1849 (TMN 1698).

²⁰⁷ Nīshāpūr apparently never fully passed to Ḥasan Khān Sālār's control despite the fact that he exerted great military pressure there. At the time of Ḥusām al-Salṭāna's campaign in spring 1265/1849, Nīshāpūr was still held by Ḥamza Mīrzā's appointee, Imāmverdī Bayāt (TRSN X: 373, 384; NT 980; 995).

²⁰⁸ TRSN X: 373; NT 984, 989, 993–4.

²⁰⁹ There is contradictory information on the position of Qāyin during this period. Hidāyat reports that Ḥamza Mīrzā incorporated it into the sphere of government after entering Mashhad in Dhū al-Qaʿda 1263/October 1847 (TRSN X: 328). Yet there is evidence that the hereditary governor, Asadullāh Khān Khuẓaima, remained there until he was displaced by Ḥasan Khān Sālār in 1264/1848 (Bāmdād 1992 I: 115).

²¹⁰ NT 981–2.

²¹¹ The coins minted in the name of Ḥasan Khān Sālār carried the following verse: *Sikka bar zar mizanad sālār-i dīn, yāvarash bāshad imām-i hashtumīn*—"The leader (*sālār*) of religion strikes golden coins; may he receive the assistance of the eighth *imām*" (Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 336).

²¹² Ḥusām al-Salṭāna left Tehran on 5 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1264/2 November 1848 (TRSN X: 362, 374; NT 968–9, 986). See also Busse 1972: 282.

²¹³ TRSN X: 375–7; NT 980–2, 988–91.

January 1849.²¹⁴ In the spring of 1265/1849, Ḥusām al-Saltāna began to make slow but steady progress. Ḥasan Khān Sālār successively lost control over Turshīz, Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya, Juvain, Sabzavār (on 14 Rabīʿ II/9 March) and Nīshāpūr (on Naurūz),²¹⁵ and found himself besieged in Mashhad for nine months from Rajab 1265 to Naurūz 1266/June 1849 to March 1850.²¹⁶ During the early stages of the siege, Ḥasan Khān Sālār was backed by the prominent Afshār, Hazāra and Turkmen leaders. He also enjoyed the support of the general population of Mashhad to the extent that even beggars equipped themselves with daggers to defend the city.²¹⁷ By Dhū al-Ḥijja 1265/October 1849, however, his decision to replenish his treasury by melting down gold and silver assets of Imām Riżā's shrine worth 22,000 *tūmān* caused public opinion to swing against him.²¹⁸ The confiscations of grain from the shrine apparently were of little benefit to the general population, and complaints of high food prices began to reach Ḥusām al-Saltāna in early 1850.²¹⁹

On 9 Jumādā I 1266/23 March 1850, a number of Ḥasan Khān Sālār's tribal allies like Karīmdād Khān Hazāra, ʿAbbās Qulī Khān Darra Gazī and Urāz Khān Toqtamīsh Sarakhsī opened the city gates to the royal troops. Because of his abusive behavior towards a number of influential ulama, including the *imām jumʿa* Ḥājjī Mīrzā ʿAskarī and the *mutavallī* Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī, Ḥasan Khān Sālār was denied sanctuary in the shrine of Imām Riżā and submitted to Ḥusām al-Saltāna. On 16 Jumādā II 1266/29 April 1850, he was executed along with his son Amīr Aṣlān and his brother Muḥammad ʿAlī Khān Qājār Develū. His other brother Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān Bēglerbēgī, who had been taken prisoner at the time of Ḥusām al-Saltāna's conquest of Sabzavār, was put to death in Tehran on 9 Rajab 1266/21 May 1850.²²⁰ Among Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula's four sons mentioned by the chronicles, only Muḥammad Qulī Khān Ishk Āqāsī was allowed to return to the royal court in 1282/1865, where he gained an appointment as minister of justice a year later.²²¹ Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula's entire property, including the lands he had amassed in Gīlān, Burūjird, Astarābād, Māzandarān and Khurāsān, was confiscated by the king.²²²

THE GOVERNMENT OF SULTĀN MURĀD MĪRZĀ ḤUSĀM AL-SALTĀNA²²³ AND FARĪDŪN MĪRZĀ FARMĀNFARMĀ (1266–1275/1850–1858)

Lasting from 1847 until March 1850, Ḥasan Khān Sālār's rebellion took up the last one and a half years of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār's reign and extended one and a half years into the reign of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh. While disorders also affected Iṣfahān and Kirmān, Khurāsān posed the greatest challenge to Qājār authority during this period.²²⁴ After gaining control of Mashhad, Ḥusām al-Saltāna stayed on as governor of Khurāsān until his recall to Tehran in Shaʿbān 1269/May 1853. Between Rajab 1270/April 1854 and Rabīʿ II 1272/December 1855, the government of Khurāsān was entrusted to Ḥusām al-Saltāna's full brother Farīdūn Mīrzā. In the winter of 1855–56, Ḥusām al-Saltāna was again appointed governor of Khurāsān amid growing concerns about the unstable position of Herat. Ḥusām al-Saltāna's return from Tehran to Khurāsān on 16 Rabīʿ II 1272/26 December 1855 coincided with the death of Farīdūn Mīrzā.²²⁵ From 1 Shaʿbān 1272–25

²¹⁴ NT 985–6. See also TRSN X: 377–8. In the summer of 1267/1851 Jaʿfar Qulī Khān was still present at the court of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (*Sifratnāma* 98; Persian text 64).

²¹⁵ NT 994–5. See also TRSN X: 378–84.

²¹⁶ NT 1045. See also TRSN X: 391–2; TMN 1699–1700.

²¹⁷ NT 1048. See also TRSN X: 396.

²¹⁸ NT 1050–1.

²¹⁹ TRSN X: 412; NT 1097.

²²⁰ NT 994, 1101–4. See also TRSN X: 415–20; TMN 1705; Bāmdād 1992 I: 328–9; Raḡavī 1999: 217.

²²¹ TRSN X: 341; “Āṣaf al-Daula, Ḥājj Muḥammad Qulī Khān,” DM.

²²² Bāmdād 1992 I: 154, 329.

²²³ Sultān Murād Mīrzā Ḥusām al-Saltāna (1818–1883) was the 13th son of ʿAbbās Mīrzā Nāʾib al-Saltāna and a brother of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār (Bāmdād 1992 II: 104).

²²⁴ Lambton 1988b: 16–17.

²²⁵ NT 1304.

Ṣafar 1273/7 April–25 October 1856 Ḥusām al-Saltāna undertook a final attempt to reestablish Qājār control in Herat.²²⁶ On Naurūz 1275/1859, he was posted to the governorship of Fārs.²²⁷

Ḥusām al-Saltāna's first governorship in Khurāsān was characterized by efforts to strengthen Qājār presence in Herat and on the northeastern frontier. Within the core regions of Khurāsān, Ḥusām al-Saltāna's choice of allies served to strengthen the tribal leadership of Khabūshān, Darra Gaz and Bujnūrd. Sām Khān Īlkhānī Za'farānlū, who had proved a steadfast ally of the Qājārs during Ḥasan Khān Sālār's rebellion, also assumed a pivotal role during the campaigns against the Turkmens in 1851, the intervention in Herat in 1852, the defence of Sarakhs against Khīva in 1854, and the siege of Herat in 1856. His brother Yazdānvirdī Khān was governor of Khabūshān.²²⁸ The return of the Kurd Za'farānlū leadership to power is remarkable in the light of the fact that Sām Khān's father Rizā Qulī Khān Za'farānlū had been among the most formidable antagonists of the Qājār administration in the late 1820s, and his imprisonment and subsequent death in 1833 had coincided with the destruction of his family's fort in Khabūshān. The career of 'Abbās Qulī Khān Darra Gazī is equally interesting, as his title reflects a close cooperation of the Chāpushlū leadership with 'Abbās Mīrzā Nā'ib al-Saltāna. Their intimate relationship with the provincial government continued throughout Allāhyār Khān Āṣaf al-Daula's tenure. Though 'Abbās Qulī Khān sided with Ḥasan Khān Sālār's rebellion, he was among the nobles who opened the city gates to Ḥusām al-Saltāna's troops in March 1850. During Ḥusām al-Saltāna's governorship, he briefly gained the governorship of Sarakhs in 1267/1851. When he died two years later during an assignment as Qājār governor of Marv, his position passed on to his son Bahādūr Khān.²²⁹ Another of Ḥasan Khān Sālār's former allies also made an impressive career. The appointment of Ja'far Qulī Khān Shādillū of Bujnūrd to the governments of Jājarm, Nardīn and Astarābād in 1271/1854 underlined the continued strength of the tribal elite.²³⁰

The first locale to attract Ḥusām al-Saltāna's attention was Herat, where the death of Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai and the succession of his son Sa'īd Muḥammad Khān in June 1851 brought about opportunities for intervention. Contrary to his powerful father, Sa'īd Muḥammad Khān was unable to command the allegiance of the local leadership and faced military pressure by the Muḥammadzai chief of Qandahār, Sardār Kuhandil Khān, who conquered Farāh and Isfizār in March 1852 and pushed onwards to the outskirts of Herat. In response, the Qājār government dispatched two separate armies under the command of Sām Khān Īlkhānī and 'Abbās Qulī Khān Darra Gazī. Upon the arrival of the Iranian troops before Herat, Kuhandil Khān gave up his designs on Herat and withdrew to Qandahār. Sām Khān Īlkhānī assumed control of the citadel of Herat until the third week of May 1852. Subsequently, the Qal'a-yi Ikhtiyār al-Dīn passed to Afghan possession again, but the Iranian soldiers lingered in the province for another three months.²³¹ As a

²²⁶ TRSN X: 674; NT 1204, 1234–5, 1304.

²²⁷ Busse 1972: 339; Bāmdād 1992 I: 107.

²²⁸ NT 1123, 1193, 1195; ST 211; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 II: 29; TRSN X: 483. See also Markham 1977: 498–99; C. E. Yate 1900: 182.

²²⁹ NT 1124, 1202–3; *Sifāratnāma* (Schefer 1975): 172, 213; Persian text 110, 140–1; TRSN X: 542; *Gaz. Iran* II: 139; Markham 1977: 499–500; C. E. Yate 1900: 166.

²³⁰ TRSN X: 612–13; NT 1282, 1372; Lambton 1988b: 44. For Ja'far Qulī Khān's policies towards the Akhal Teke Turkmens, see König 1962, 27–8.

²³¹ Champagne gives a detailed account of the Iranian interference in Herat and its repercussions on the relationship with the British (1981: 281–314). See also Amanat 1997: 226, 231; Kelly 1991: 454. Among the available Persian sources, Hidāyat's version of events is the most complete. He reports that Ḥusām al-Saltāna ordered Sām Khān Īlkhānī Za'farānlū to advance to Herat, while 'Abbās Qulī Mīr Panja Kurd Jahānbēglū was charged with the protection of the "border between Khurāsān and Herat" (*sarhadd-i Khurāsān va Harāt*), located some place west of Ghūriyan. According to his account, the cavalry of Sām Khān and Herat came out of the city of Herat to combat the besieging forces under Kuhandil Khān. After a heavy engagement, Sām Khān summoned the support of 'Abbās Qulī Mīr Panja. The news of the impending arrival of additional Qājār troops convinced Kuhandil Khān to give up the siege of Herat and to retreat to Qandahār. Sām Khān stayed in Herat for several months to put Sa'īd Muḥammad Khān's affairs in order (TRSN X: 542–3). See also NT 1139, 1192, 1196; KR 111 (Patterson 1988: 165–6); ST 211; McChesney/Khorrami 2013 II: 29. The correspondence contained in Ādamiyat (1982) indicates that Kuhandil Khān withdrew from Herat in Jumādā II 1268/March–April 1852. Amanat's statement that the Persian army was already present in Herat in late 1851 and evicted Kuhandil's forces from the citadel is not borne out by the available chronicles (Amanat, "Herat vi. the Herat Question," *E.Ir.* XII: 222).

result of this incident, the British envoy Justin Sheil negotiated an agreement with the Prime Minister Mīrzā Āqā Khān Nūrī I‘timād al-Daula (1851–1858) on 14 Rabī‘ II 1269/25 January 1853, according to which the Iranian government would refrain from interfering with the affairs of Herat.²³²

Ḥusām al-Saltāna’s second great endeavor was to extend Qājār authority to Sarakhs and Marv. This northeastern push occurred against the backdrop of constant Turkmen incursions. In 1267–68/1851–52, Turbat-i Shaikh Jām, Turbat-i Haidariya, Bujnūrd, Khabūshān and the environs of Mashhad were subject to Turkmen raids.²³³ Since the early nineteenth century, the Khāns of Khīva had repeatedly made their presence felt in the regions located on the fringes of Qājār control and had inserted themselves as a third party in the conflicts concerning Herat in 1818 and 1837–38. Between 1851 and 1854, the Qājār governors of Khurāsān renewed their claims to Sarakhs and Marv, thus entering an open confrontation with Khīva. Ḥusām al-Saltāna succeeded in incorporating Sarakhs, albeit loosely, into the administration of Khurāsān. After its conquest by Nā‘ib al-Saltāna in 1832, this region had turned into a staging ground for Ḥasan Khān Sālār’s insurgencies in 1847–48. In June 1851, Ḥusām al-Saltāna temporarily forced Sarakhs into submission but, owing to Khivan pressure, was unable to establish direct control there.²³⁴ His designated governor ‘Abbās Qulī Khān Darra Gazī was forced to flee shortly after his appointment to evade a plot against him by the Khivan representative Mīr Aḥmad Khān Jamshīdī.²³⁵ However, the Khivan presence was not sustained enough to allow the tribal leadership of Sarakhs to dismiss Qājār claims to sovereignty. Facing a renewed military campaign by Ḥusām al-Saltāna in late summer 1268/1852, sixty Turkmen nobles (*buzurgān*) under the leadership of Urāz Khān Teke came to Mashhad and undertook to submit fifty elders as hostages, to furnish fifty men for Ḥusām al-Saltāna’s army and to station one hundred guards on the borders (*thughūr*) of Khurāsān.²³⁶ In the spring of 1854, the representatives of the Toqtamīsh and Otamīsh confederacies promised to protect the trade routes leading through their territory in exchange for grazing rights in the environs of Mashhad. In the summer of the same year, Mīrzā Faḡlullāh, the *vazīr-i nizām* of Khurāsān, used the presence of 150 Sarakhsī nobles at his court to enforce the support of their fellow tribesmen for Farīdūn Mīrzā’s military campaign to Kalāt, ‘Ishqābad (Ashgabat) and Akhal.²³⁷

While Marv had not figured much in the events of the first half of the nineteenth century, it assumed center stage in 1269/1853, when Ḥusām al-Saltāna revived Qājār claims to this region by appointing his own governor there. The Qājār hold over Marv proved to be short-lived: The Iranian troops withdrew to Mashhad in May 1854. This encouraged Muḥammad Amīn Khān Qunghrāt of Khīva to renew his claims to Marv and Sarakhs. With the assistance of Ḥukūmat Khān Ming of Maimana, he assembled an army of 40,000 Uzbek, Turkmen, Jamshīdī and Tāymanī troops and took control of Marv. On 29 Jumādā II 1271/19 March 1855 the Khivan troops reached the outskirts of Sarakhs. Subsequently, however, they suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of a relatively small Iranian/Turkmen army and, in the words of Lisān al-Mulk, “scattered like a herd of sheep pursued by a wolf”. Among the 3,000 Khivan casualties of this battle was the Khān himself, whose head was cut off and sent to Tehran. On 18 Rajab 1271/6 April 1855, Farīdūn Mīrzā re-established Qājār control over Marv and appointed Khān Savār Khān Hazāra as governor.²³⁸

Shortly after, the focus of the Khurāsān administration again shifted to Herat. On 11 December 1855, the Iranian government received a request for military assistance from the newly installed ruler of Herat,

²³² Champagne 1981: 480–3; Ādamiyat 1982: 645–6.

²³³ NT 1123, 1192–3; Khūrmūjī 1984: 117–18. On 20 Shavvāl 1267/18 August 1851, residents in the district of Turbat-i Haidariya complained of rising insecurity and ironically commented: “Look how well Ḥusām al-Saltāna has secured the province: where the Turkmens used to come in parties of 30–40, now 4,000 to 5,000 come at a time!” (Za‘farānlū 1968: 55).

²³⁴ *Sifāratnāma* (Schefer): 84, 88–90, 98–99; Persian text: 54, 56–8, 64–5.

²³⁵ NT 1122–4; TRSN X: 484–5; Khūrmūjī 1984: 92–3; *Sifāratnāma* (Schefer) 1975: 172, (Persian text) 110. See also Sārī 1995: 55.

²³⁶ NT 1195.

²³⁷ NT 1237–41. See also Khūrmūjī 1984: 138.

²³⁸ TRSN X: 583–7; NT 1247–55, 1355, 1475; *Sifāratnāma* (Schefer 1975): 216–21; Persian text, p. 142–7; Khūrmūjī 1984: 142–5, 230. See also Bregel, “Central Asia vii. In the 12th–13th/18th–19th Centuries,” *E.Ir.* V: 198; Markham 1977: 500. According to Dshikijew, this battle took place on 12 March 1855 (Dshikijew 1994: 171).

Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān.²³⁹ A grandson of Fīrūz al-Dīn Sadūzai, Muḥammad Yūsuf b. Malik Qāsim had resided in Iran under Qājār tutelage since 1844 and served as governor of Turbat-i Shaikh Jām under Farīdūn Mīrzā.²⁴⁰ On 3 Muḥarram 1272/15 September 1855, he deposed the Alakūzai ruler Saʿīd Muḥammad Khān b. Yār Muḥammad without seeking formal Qājār sanction or support.²⁴¹ The shift in power in Herat coincided with a growing Muḥammadzai presence in southern and western Afghanistan. In November 1855, Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān incorporated Qandahār into his realm and appointed his own governor to Farāh.²⁴² The swift reaction of the Iranian government to Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān's message suggests the possibility that preparations for a move against Herat had already been under way. As early as 20 December 1855, the Tehran Gazette announced the dispatch of troops to Herat.²⁴³ In February 1856, an advance guard under Sām Khān Īlkhānī briefly entered Herat but withdrew to Ghūriyān after encountering hostility from the local Afghān leadership.²⁴⁴

With the arrival of Ḥusām al-Saltāna's troops before Ghūriyān, the border stronghold quickly fell to Iranian control on 22 Rajab 1272/29 March 1856.²⁴⁵ Farāh, Isfizār and Kurukh soon followed.²⁴⁶ The siege of Herat, by contrast, dragged on from early April to the end of October 1856, causing considerable consternation to Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh and his courtiers.²⁴⁷ The poor success of the 30,000 Iranian troops can be attributed in great part to the fact that Ḥusām al-Saltāna's attempt to play different Herati factions off against each other backfired and, rather than easing his entrance into Herat, complicated matters even further. While engaging Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān in peace negotiations, the Iranian side cut a separate deal with his *vazīr* Sartīp ʿĪsā Khān Bardurrānī to hand over the Sadūzai prince. ʿĪsā Khān indeed gained control over Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān and sent him and a number of his courtiers to the Iranian camp on 22 Shaʿbān 1272/28 April 1856. This part of the deal having been accomplished, it turned out that little common purpose existed between Ḥusām al-Saltāna and ʿĪsā Khān. While the *vazīr* expected sovereignty as his part of the bargain and showed no inclination to relinquish the control of Herat, Ḥusām al-Saltāna tightened the siege on the city.²⁴⁸ Feeling betrayed by the Iranian government, ʿĪsā Khān sought British and Russians support, in vain.²⁴⁹ Ḥusām al-Saltāna, on his part, suspected Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān Muḥammadzai's machinations, and ultimately British designs to be at the root of ʿĪsā Khān's "disobedience".²⁵⁰ The Bardurrānī leader continued to hold Herat for another six months until he was forced to surrender on 25 Šafar 1273/25 October 1856 by of lack of provisions.²⁵¹

In July 1856, as Ḥusām al-Saltāna was making little or no progress before the gates of Herat, the British government decided to exert pressure on Iran by sending troops to the Persian Gulf. On 1 November 1856, the Governor-General of India declared war against Iran arguing that the invasion of Herat constituted a breach of the Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1853. On 4 December 1856, British troops occupied the island of Khārg, and on 8 February 1857, the Iranian troops suffered a decisive defeat near Khvāshāb in the region of

²³⁹ Champagne, 1981: 357. According to *Nāsikh al-tavārikh*, Ḥusām al-Saltāna received Muḥammad Yūsuf's request for aid upon his return to Mashhad on 5 Jumādā I 1272/13 January 1856 (NT 1304).

²⁴⁰ NT 1243. Markham reports that Ḥusām al-Saltāna appointed Muḥammad Yūsuf Khān to the command of a body of irregular cavalry at "Serjam" [Sar-i Jām?] on the Herat Frontier in October 1851 (Markham 1977: 500–1).

²⁴¹ The Iranian sources emphasize the instability Saʿīd Muḥammad's rule engendered in eastern Khurāsān. Lisān al-Mulk and Hidāyat highlight the fact that he rendered military assistance to the Khān of Khīva during the battle for Sarakhs in 1855. Another source of conflict were depredations by Afghān horsemen under his command, who extended their raids as far as Bīrjand, Qāyin, Tūn and Ṭabas, as well as Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya (TRSN X: 665–7; NT 1276).

²⁴² TRSN X: 667–9; NT 1277–8, 1290, 1297. See also Noelle 1997: 243.

²⁴³ Champagne 1981: 357–8.

²⁴⁴ TRSN X: 669. See also Taylor 1858c: 936–8.

²⁴⁵ TRSN X: 673. According to Lisān al-Mulk, the governor of Ghūriyān submitted on 23 Rajab 1272/30 March 1856 (NT 1306).

²⁴⁶ TRSN X: 679–80; NT 1312, 1318, 1323, 1331. See also Champagne 1981: 360–1.

²⁴⁷ NT 1319–21, 1329–30. See also Champagne 1981: 369.

²⁴⁸ TRSN X: 676–7; NT 1309–10.

²⁴⁹ Champagne 1981: 363–5, 367–8.

²⁵⁰ TRSN X: 677; NT 1290, 1310, 1317, 1336.

²⁵¹ TRSN X: 693–4; NT 1336. See also TMN 1793.

Bushire. British operations ceased with the battle of Muḥammira (present-day Khurramshahr) on 26 March. The Treaty of Paris concluded on this date forced Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh to relinquish his claims to Herat once and for all and to recognize the independence of Afghanistan.²⁵² Prior to the exchange of the ratified treaty in Baghdad on 2 May 1857, the Iranian Prime Minister Āqā Khān Nūrī appointed Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān's nephew Sulṭān Aḥmad Khān as governor of Herat and extracted a written oath of loyalty from him, thus skilfully undermining the independent status of Herat that had been agreed on in Paris.²⁵³ Ḥusām al-Saltāna, who opposed the evacuation of Herat in the light of the Indian Mutiny of May 1857, was summoned to Tehran.²⁵⁴

KHURĀSĀN IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

There is a noticeable decline in the quality and quantity of information concerning the affairs of Iranian Khurāsān during the second half of the nineteenth century. This may partly be attributed to the fact that the most detailed and systematic historical accounts concerning the Qājār period were written in the 1850s, whereas the source material concerning the era of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh tends to be more scattered. The lack of organized data on eastern Khurāsān during this period possibly derives from the fact that the affairs of the region generated little interest after the final loss of Marv and Herat in 1860 and 1863 respectively, and ceased entirely with the settlement of the northeastern borders in the 1880s.

Following Ḥusām al-Saltāna's recall to Tehran in 1858, incursions by the Turkmens and rivalries among the nobility of Khurāsān continued. This state of affairs was reflected and possibly enhanced by frequent changes in government. But as the rapid succession of appointments involved a number of previously known actors, one may also speak of certain continuities in the administration of Khurāsān. The name of Ḥamza Mīrzā Ḥishmat al-Daula is primarily associated with political and military mishaps in Khurāsān. Unable to contain Ḥasan Khān Sālār's rebellion, he had been forced to place himself under the protection of Yār Muḥammad Khān Alakūzai of Herat during the winter of 1848–49. His second governorship of Khurāsān from Rajab 1275–1277/February 1859–1860²⁵⁵ ended with the disastrous defeat of the Qājār army at Marv.

In the same measure, the person of Ḥusām al-Saltāna stood for military success and a degree of political stability. Similar to his first two governorships in the 1850s, Ḥusām al-Saltāna used his third tenure from Shavvāl 1277/April 1861 to re-establish a measure of control and to contain the Turkmen threat.²⁵⁶ While the military command rested with Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān Qājār Develū Ḥabīb al-Daula, the Za'farānlū Kurd leadership of Khabūshān, notably Sām Khān's half brother Amīr Ḥusain Khān Īlkhānī Shujā' al-Daula, continued to play a leading role in beating back Turkmen incursions.²⁵⁷ Ḥusām al-Saltāna's third tenure as governor ended with his arrest and deportation to Tehran in November 1863.²⁵⁸

Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān Muḥammadzai's westward thrust in 1862–63 temporarily put Herat back on the Qājār agenda. Yet if Iranian ambitions for an intervention in Herat existed, they were soon enough stifled by the British government. A small body of horsemen stationed at Kūsūya within Herat territory in the summer of 1862 to guard the province of Khurāsān from Afghan incursions had to be withdrawn owing to British pressure.²⁵⁹ In conversations with the British secretary Eastwick in October 1862, Ḥusām al-Saltāna admitted that the financial burdens created by an occupation of Herat outweighed the possible benefits of a conquest. At the same time, he emphasized that the Qājār efforts to regain control of Herat and Marv were less motivated by "a weak vanity of adding to territories already too large to be easily governed" than by the

²⁵² Champagne 1981: 376, 380–90, 484–97; Daulatshāhī 1964: 273–5.

²⁵³ Champagne 1981: 390–1; Taylor 1858c: 946.

²⁵⁴ Bāmdād 1992 II: 106–7.

²⁵⁵ TMN 1815–16, 1826, 1832; Bāmdād 1992: 107; Raḡavī 1999: 218.

²⁵⁶ TMN 1839–40, 1849; Raḡavī 1999: 218.

²⁵⁷ Khūrmūjī 1984: 263–4, 280–1, 297–9. See also Bāmdād 1992 I: 390–2, II: 108, IV: 13; Eastwick 1976 II: 196–7; Farmayan 1981: 58; Shākīrī 1986: 109.

²⁵⁸ Sheikhholeslami 1997: 205.

²⁵⁹ Wynne 1870a: 53.

more practical need to curb Turkmen incursions into Khurāsān proper. In view of these facts, the prince professed his dismay at the continued British support for Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān and declared that it was impossible to defend the province of Khurāsān and to develop its potential as “the brightest jewel in the Persian crown”, as long as England “shackles and impedes every effort that the Persian government makes for the protection of its own subjects”.²⁶⁰

Although Eastwick acknowledged “a great deal of truth” in Ḥusām al-Saltāna’s remarks, the British government continued to view the conflict over Herat strictly as one between two “Afghan principalities” and not a concern of the Iranian government.²⁶¹ Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s dramatic announcement in December 1862 that “so long as Persia had a soldier or a toman left, she would struggle to free herself from the Afghan incubus on the frontier of Khorassan” also fell on deaf ears.²⁶² By 1864, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh seemed to have reconciled himself to the loss of Herat. When the Hungarian traveller Ármín Vámbéry informed the king that Herat had been reduced to a “heap of ashes” by the Afghans he replied coolly, “I have no taste for such ruined cities.”²⁶³ The second grievance of the Qājār government, a possible advance by Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān into Sīstān, was initially dismissed by the British government on the basis of the assumption that Iran commanded no sovereignty there.²⁶⁴ Subsequent to the fall of Herat, however, London assented to an Iranian assertion of authority in Sīstān by force of arms.²⁶⁵

Ḥusām al-Saltāna was succeeded by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s teenage son, Sulṭān Ḥusain Mīrzā Jalāl al-Daula, who acted both as governor of Khurāsān and guardian of Imām Riḏā’s shrine from 1281/1864 until his death during the cholera epidemic of 1285/1868.²⁶⁶ While authority formally rested with Jalāl al-Daula, the reins of government were held by two powerful Qājār officials, the *vazīr* Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān Develū Ḥāhīr al-Daula²⁶⁷ and the *sipahsālār* Mīrzā Muḥammad Khān (d. 1284/1867).²⁶⁸ In this period, the Khuzaima leadership enforced Qājār claims to Sīstān. Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s first trip to Khurāsān in 1284/1867 coincided with the last part of Jalāl al-Daula’s tenure as governor. During his visit to Bujnūrd in Rabī‘ II 1284/August 1867, the Shāh ordered the two most prominent Kurdish leaders Amīr Ḥusain Khān Shujā‘ al-Daula Za‘farānlū and Ḥaidar Qulī Khān Sihām al-Daula Shādillū to organize a raid against the Yomut Turkmens of Gurgān.²⁶⁹

In his third tenure as governor of Khurāsān from 1285–1288/1869–1871, Ḥamza Mīrzā followed the precedent set by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh. His policy of employing the chiefs of Khabūshān and Bujnūrd against the neighboring Turkmens obviously served the dual purpose of keeping the Turkmens in check while simultaneously defusing ongoing tensions between the Za‘farānlū and Shādillū Kurds. The following attack on Qara Qal‘a by the combined forces of Khabūshān and Bujnūrd in the summer of 1286/1869 elicited counter attacks by the Akhal Teke, which primarily affected Darra Gaz.²⁷⁰ Another issue that required Ḥamza Mīrzā’s attention were the activities of the governor of Sīstān, Mīr ‘Alam III Khuzaima of Qāyīn, towards extending his authority across the right bank of the Hilmand and the resultant clash of interests with Amīr Shīr ‘Alī Khān Muḥammadzai (r. 1869–1878).²⁷¹

²⁶⁰ Eastwick 1976 II: 244–5, 250–3. See also Champagne 1981: 446.

²⁶¹ Wynne 1870a: 63.

²⁶² Wynne 1870a: 57.

²⁶³ Vámbéry 1864: 295–6.

²⁶⁴ Wynne 1870a: 64.

²⁶⁵ Wynne 1870a: 57, 65–6.

²⁶⁶ TMN 1903. See also Mīr Niyā 1994: 153; Raḡavī 1999: 218. According to Yate, Jalāl al-Daula was appointed governor of Khurāsān in 1866 (C. E. Yate 1900: 325).

²⁶⁷ Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān Qājār Develū Ḥāhīr al-Daula was appointed as *vazīr* of Khurāsān after Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh’s return to Tehran in Jumādā II 1284/October 1867 (TMN 1897). See also Bāmdād 1992 IV: 14.

²⁶⁸ TMN 1884; 1893–4; Bāmdād 1992 II: 117.

²⁶⁹ MB 1555, 1558; Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 378–87.

²⁷⁰ TMN 1909. See also Napier 1977: 76; Sārī 1995: 138–9, 144–6, 156–8, 161.

²⁷¹ Wynne 1870a: 81, 84, 87.

Ḥusām al-Saltāna, who returned to Khurāsān in 1288/1871–72,²⁷² was also locked into repeated confrontations with the Turkmens.²⁷³ Within a year, however, he lost his post because of his conflict with and open criticism of the Prime Minister Ḥāj Mīrzā Ḥusain Khān Mushīr al-Daula.²⁷⁴ At this point, the governorship of Khurāsān passed to Ḥāj Ḥusain Khān Shāhseven Shihāb al-Mulk, who held this post until his death in Muḥarram 1292/March 1875.²⁷⁵ During Shihāb al-Mulk's tenure, Amīr Ḥusain Khān Shujā' al-Daula Za'farānlū again played a leading role in combating the neighboring Turkmens.²⁷⁶ Shihāb al-Mulk was succeeded by Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān Qājār Develū Ṣāḥir al-Daula, who had already been involved with the administration from 1861–1868. Muḥammad Nāṣir Khān's governorship ended with his death in 1294/1877.²⁷⁷ Between 1294/1877 and Sha'bān 1301/May 1884, Muḥammad Taqī Mīrzā Rukn al-Daula b. Muḥammad Shāh Qājār²⁷⁸ held the governorship of Khurāsān and Sīstān with two short interruptions.²⁷⁹ Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's second trip to Khurāsān in 1300/1883 coincided with his tenure.²⁸⁰

In the summer of 1301/1884, the governorship of Khurāsān passed to Mīrzā 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī, who received the title of Āṣaf al-Daula.²⁸¹ In his relationship with the Qājār court, he assumed an independent bearing and, in Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's opinion, went as far as to conceive of himself as the "King of Khurāsān".²⁸² Internally, Āṣaf al-Daula's governorship was known for strictness and acts of oppression. In Shavvāl 1302/July 1885, he faced a general rebellion in Mashhad which was sparked by his conflict with Abū al-Qāsim Khān b. Muḥammad Khān Qarā'ī, the grandson of the famous Ishāq Khān of Turbat-i Ḥaidariya. Abū al-Qāsim Khān tried to evade Mīrzā 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī's attempt to acquire his possessions by leasing them to 'Alī Mardān Khān Tīmūrī Nuṣrat al-Mulk and seeking sanctuary at the shrine of Imām Riẓā at Mashhad. Mīrzā 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī violated the sanctity of the shrine and removed Abū al-Qāsim Khān Qarā'ī by force, thus bringing the wrath of the clergy and of the people of Mashhad upon himself. As the population of Mashhad surrounded the citadel, the governor's troops refused to follow his order to open fire on the rebels. The unrest subsided as soon as 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī was recalled to Tehran in Jumādā II 1303/March 1886. Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh appointed Maḥmūd Khān Qarāguzlū Nāṣir al-Mulk in his stead, whose governorship from Jumādā I 1303–late 1304/February 1886–summer 1887 is mainly remembered for his kind manners and his official pepper-and-salt attire.²⁸³

²⁷² 23 March 1871–10 March 1872.

²⁷³ TMN 1923, 1925–6; Raḥavī 1999: 219. At the time of Bellew's visit to Mashhad in April 1872, nearly one hundred Turkmen hostages were held there to ensure the obedience of their fellow tribesmen (Bellew 1874: 361–2). In May 1872, a member of the Goldsmid delegation left the following account of Ḥusām al-Saltāna: "The Prince is a man of about sixty years of age, aristocratic alike in appearance and manners... he talked as one born in the purple, who from his youth had been a ruler of men. His dress was very simple, much resembling that of an English gentleman; nor was this resemblance in one respect only: he discoursed on all subjects with an ease and fluency which denoted not only extensive reading, but the readiness of a complete man of the world: appearing fairly well versed in European politics (a rare thing in Persia), and displaying some knowledge of the details of the English Constitution" (Goldsmid 1876 I: 359).

²⁷⁴ Bāmdād 1992 I: 415; II: 109–110.

²⁷⁵ TMN 1935; Bāmdād 1992 I: 393–4, II: 109; Raḥavī 1999: 220.

²⁷⁶ TMN 1953; Shākirī 1986: 110.

²⁷⁷ TMN 1957; Bāmdād 1992 IV: 13–14; Migeod 1990: 131; Mīr Niyā 1994: 159.

²⁷⁸ Rukn al-Daula was the fourth son of Muḥammad Shāh Qājār and a younger half brother of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (Bāmdād 1992 III: 312). See also Curzon 1966 I: 168.

²⁷⁹ TMN 2030, 2036, 2040, 2145; KR 3. Mīrzā Ḥusain Khān Mushīr al-Daula's appointment to the governorship of Khurāsān and the guardianship of Imām Riẓā's shrine on 18 Sha'bān 1298/16 July 1881 was cut short by his death in Mashhad two months later, on 21 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1298/14 November 1881 (TMN 2026; Bāmdād 1992 I: 422; III: 313). In Rabī' II 1300/February–March 1882 Ḥusām al-Saltāna gained the governorship of Khurāsān for the last time but died on 2 Jumādā I 1300/11 March 1883 before he could take up his post. (TMN 2047; Bāmdād 1992 II: 104; Mīr Niyā 1994: 161, 204).

²⁸⁰ Tavaḥḥudī 1985 II: 396–7.

²⁸¹ According to the documents available at the Āstān-i Quds, Mīrzā 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī acted as governor of Khurāsān and *mutavallī bāshī* of Imām Riẓā's shrine from Shavvāl 1301–Dhū al-Ḥijja 1302/August 1884–September 1885. I'timād al-Saltāna's daily notes allow the conclusion that Mīrzā 'Abd al-Vahhāb Khān Shīrāzī held the government of Khurāsān from 17 Ramaẓān 1301–Jumādā II 1303/11 July 1884–March 1886 (Bāmdād 1992 II: 309). See also Za'farānlū 1968: 143.

²⁸² Sheikholeslami 1997: 95, 105, 163.

²⁸³ Bāmdād 1992: IV: 58. See also Radde 1898: 176.

On 14 Dhū al-Qa‘da 1304/4 August 1887 Muḥammad Taqī Mīrẓā Rukn al-Daula succeeded Nāṣir al-Mulk to the governorship of Khurāsān and held this post until Shavvāl 1308/May 1891. His second tenure as governor coincided with Turkmen unrest in Gurgān and a confrontation with the Shādillū governor of Bujnūrd, Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū Sihām al-Daula. Interestingly, the central government interjected itself into this conflict and attempted to defuse it by urging both Rukn al-Daula and Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū not to undermine the existing *modus vivendi* between the provincial government and the local nobility.²⁸⁴ In a number of direct communications with Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū in April and May 1887, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh encouraged the Shādillū leader to resume his cooperation with Rukn al-Daula. In March 1888, the influential Qājār official ‘Alī Aṣghar Amīn al-Sulṭān (1274–1325/1858–1907)²⁸⁵ reminded Rukn al-Daula of the need to conciliate the Shādillū leadership.²⁸⁶ These efforts notwithstanding, Rukn al-Daula deposed Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū and appointed Vajīhullāh Mīrẓā Saif al-Mulk in his stead. Lasting until 1308/1891–92, Saif al-Mulk’s governorship of Bujnūrd and Gurgān was characterized by a policy of repression, causing a number of Turkmens to migrate to the Russian-occupied territories.²⁸⁷

There is little information on the particulars of Mīrẓā Faṭḥ ‘Alī Khān Shīrāzī’s governorship and his guardianship of Imām Riẓā’s shrine from 1308–1310/1891–1893.²⁸⁸ He was succeeded by Abū al-Faṭḥ Mīrẓā Mu‘ayyid al-Daula (d. 1330/1911–12), the eldest son of Sulṭān Murād Mīrẓā Ḥusām al-Saltāna, who held the governorship of Khurāsān from Sha‘bān 1310–1312/February 1893–1894/95. The guardianship of Imām Riẓā’s shrine rested with Muḥammad ‘Alī Ṣadr al-Mamālik during this period.²⁸⁹ After Ghulām Riẓā Khān’s brief tenure as governor in 1312/1894–95, Muḥammad Taqī Rukn al-Daula regained this post for the third time and oversaw the affairs of Khurāsān from 1897 until his death in 1318/1900–01.²⁹⁰

CONCLUSION

While the exact modalities of provincial government still remain to be explored, there can be no doubt that Khurāsān experienced a tightening of central authority in the late nineteenth century. In 1889, Curzon summed up the developments the province had undergone in the course of the past ninety years, contrasting its former position as a hotbed of conflict and a fraying fiasco of territorial disintegration with the degree of stability that had currently been achieved:

In the early part of this century, desolated by border warfare on the north, inhabited by turbulent chieftains and conflicting tribes, and commonly dependent upon the fluctuating politics and fortunes of Herat, it was the vulnerable spot of the Kajars’ dominions, a sort of Ireland to an otherwise fairly united kingdom... It is not indeed till the last ten or fifteen years that Khorasan may be said to have become thoroughly fused, in sentiment as well as in title, with the rest of the Shah’s dominions. The present King, who, whatever his failings, has undeniably consolidated his reduced but still compact territories, can boast a firmer hold upon the province than any previous member of his dynasty, and is as unquestionably sovereign at Meshed [Mashhad] as he is at Teheran.²⁹¹

In practical terms, the incorporation of Khurāsān into the Qājār kingdom was enhanced by a leap in modern technology. At a point in time when the major communications of the country merely consisted of well-

²⁸⁴ Sheikholeslami 1997: 85.

²⁸⁵ Bāmdād 1992 II: 387; Calmard, “Atābak-e A‘ẓam,” *E.Ir.* II: 878–90.

²⁸⁶ Amīn al-Sulṭān instructed Rukn al-Daula to “treat him [Yār Muḥammad Khān Shādillū] and his dependents with maximum respect and use all within your power to cooperate with him and help him, so that he would return to Bujnurd willingly. Then again you should strengthen him, treat him kindly, cooperate with him and his dependents, lest he becomes unhappy and disappointed.” (Amīn al-Sulṭān to Rukn al-Daula, 14 March 1888, quoted in Sheikholeslami 1997: 194).

²⁸⁷ Mīr Niyā 1994: 224–5. See also Curzon 1966 I: 190.

²⁸⁸ Bāmdād 1992 II: 309–11; Mīr Niyā 1994: 163, 227.

²⁸⁹ KR 7; Bāmdād 1992 I: 51–3; Mīr Niyā 1994: 229. See also C. E. Yate 1900: 45.

²⁹⁰ Bāmdād 1992 III: 317; Mīr Niyā 1994: 240. According to Yate, Rukn al-Daula arrived in Khurāsān in November 1897 (C. E. Yate 1900: 60, 418).

²⁹¹ Curzon 1966 I: 180–1.

trodden camel tracks and a postal service of *chāpārs*,²⁹² Iran profited from the British thrust towards modern methods of communication. Propelled by the need to create a closer link between India and the Home Government in the aftermath of the Mutiny of 1857, the British government sought to provide a linkage between the Indian telegraph system and that of England. Under the auspices of the Indo-European telegraph scheme, the British entered a number of agreements with the Qājār government. The first contract was concluded in 1862 and provided for the establishment of a telegraph link from Khāniqīn on the Turkish border to Tehran and then on to Bushire. The establishment of a second line between Bushire and Julfa in 1283/1866–67 linked the Iranian telegraph system to the British line from Bushire to India and the Russian lines in the Caucasus.²⁹³ Within Iran, the first telegraph lines came into being as early as 1859.²⁹⁴ In 1892, Curzon summarized the interaction between British interests and Qājār efforts at modernization and highlighted the contradictions and asynchronies accompanying the introduction of the telegraph:

By a curious inversion of the customary chronology... the electric telegraph was already in full working order throughout Persia long before a decent letter-post had been organised. The first experiment was made by the Government in 1859, with a line from Teheran to Sultāniyeh [Sulṭāniya]; but this was so badly constructed as to be soon abandoned. In 1860 followed a complete line from Teheran to Tabriz [Tabriz], extended in 1863 to Julfa. At this period ensued the negotiations between the British and Persian Governments that resulted in the passage of the main line of Indo-European Telegraph through Persia in transit from London to Bombay... [T]he issue of these proceedings has been the construction of a triple wire from Julfa to Teheran, worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Company; and from Teheran to Bushire, worked by a staff of the Indian Government. In addition to these lines Persia possesses some 3,000 miles of single wire lines, in a more or less dubious state of repair, which belong to the Government and are worked by a Persian staff. The capital is now connected with every city or centre of importance in the kingdom...²⁹⁵

Placing even distant provinces within immediate reach of the capital, the new technology endowed the central government with unprecedented means of control and curtailed the freedom of action the provincial governors and tribal leaders had enjoyed so far. Ultimately, however, the enhanced speed of communication and the closer supervision it implied did not coincide with a wholesale modernization of the mode of government. Instead, the telegraph served to invigorate old fashioned methods of surveillance, as Sheikholeslami observes: “The Shah grafted the modern technology onto the traditional political structure, turning it into a modern Abbasid espionage system. Telegraph offices were usually headed by colonels whose primary function was to report on the activities of the governors.”²⁹⁶

The mode in which the government utilized the telegraph epitomizes the superficial nature of the modernization the Qājār state underwent in the course of the nineteenth century. Underneath a veneer of military and administrative reform, early modern structures implying a segmentation of political power and a concomitant dispersion of resources continued to determine the mechanisms at work. In Khurāsān, the traditional patterns of authority limited the control the provincial governors enjoyed over men and goods and hampered their ability to maneuver. In the regions beyond the capital of Mashhad, the governors depended on tribal intermediaries for the collection of revenues and the maintenance of order.

The difficulty of generating sufficient resources was especially brought into focus in times of war, as the scarcity of supplies put a narrow ceiling on the scope of military action. Besides raising sufficient and sufficiently motivated forces to generate the required military momentum, the military leaders faced the task of procuring adequate provisions. Muḥammad Shāh Qājār’s campaign against Herat in the autumn of 1837 was afflicted with grave logistical problems long before it reached its destination. In the army of 12,000 men

²⁹² By 1889, only Qazvīn, Tehran and Qum were linked by carriageable roads amounting to a total of nearly two hundred miles. While superior to the camel tracks, the roads serviced by *chāpārs* were generally “strewn with rocks and boulders” in the plains and turned into “furrows or ruts” in mountainous terrain (Curzon 1966 I: 486–8). See also Polak 1860: 40.

²⁹³ TMN 1887; Amanat, “E’teżād al-Salṭana,” *E.Ir.* VIII: 670.

²⁹⁴ In 1275/1859, the telegraph line was extended from Tehran to Sulṭāniya and Tabriz (TMN 1812; 1815; Shahvar, “Telegraph, i. First Telegraph Lines in Persia,” *E.Ir.*). The telegraph connection between Tehran and Mashhad was established in 1876 (TMN 1964; C. E. Yate 1900: 325).

²⁹⁵ Curzon 1966 I: 467.

²⁹⁶ Sheikholeslami 1997: 90. See also *ibid.* p. 205.

approaching Sabzavār in September 1837, there was reportedly no “commander of any talent or experience, even at the head of a battalion. The higher classes are disgusted, and the soldiers discontented; the baggage cattle are deficient in numbers, and the country, through which the army is to march, is deficient of supplies of any kind.”²⁹⁷ In autumn 1862, Ḥusām al-Saltāna likewise encountered problems feeding his army of 18,000 men within the core regions of Khurāsān province when he took position at Qalandarābād to discourage possible intrusions by Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān.²⁹⁸ Eventually, the great famine of 1870–1872 highlighted the fact that Khurāsān was still very far away from Tehran both in conceptional and infrastructural terms. Thus Ḥamza Mīrzā’s repeated requests for grain only elicited an impatient response from Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in Rajab 1287/November 1870: “I have had enough and will no longer listen to all these complaints (*āh va nāla*) of the difficulties [prevailing in Khurāsān]. I have given every bonus [*takhfīf*] possible. It is enough!”²⁹⁹ In 1872, the British representative Bellew reported that neither Ḥusām al-Saltāna nor anybody else in the Qājār administration had “moved a finger” to alleviate the suffering caused by the general scarcity, which had cost 120,000 lives in Khurāsān and had deprived Mashhad of half of its population.³⁰⁰

For all its internal segmentation, the fact remains that Khurāsān outwardly assumed a bounded identity defined by outlines that became increasingly distinct in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. This process was generated in great part by territorial loss, as the contested space was divided into new political entities, such as Afghanistan, British-controlled Balūchistān and the Russian province of Transcaspia.³⁰¹ In western Iran, the most incisive developments took place much earlier with the Russian annexations of the Caucasian provinces as determined by the treaties of Gulistān and Turkmānchāy in 1813 and 1828 respectively. During this period, eastern Khurāsān still was a land of opportunity holding the promise of expansion or, in the light of the continuing vitality of the territorial perceptions stemming from the Safavid era, calling for reclamation. Up to the 1830s, the easternmost Qājār province represented a variable political landscape open to the establishment and maintenance of a loose system of clientelistic relationships with the local leadership. Following the elastic early modern pattern of control, the scope of government comprised all those regions acknowledging central authority on the basis of formulaic expressions of allegiance, such as the striking of coins and the reading of the Friday prayer in the name of the sovereign (*sikka* and *khutba*). On the practical level, claims to overlordship had to be maintained by ongoing military campaigns which served to invigorate the existing network of loyalties and to enforce the flow of revenues.

Yet even within this flexible framework of control, the radius of Qājār military activity was fairly limited. In contrast with the official rhetorical emphasis on far-flung Khurāsānīan possessions, the governors of Mashhad were mostly concerned with the practical need to establish a token authority over Herat, Sarakhs, and Marv. While Marv remained beyond the scope of direct intervention and thus represented a “terrain vague” for most of the nineteenth century, Herat was an embattled zone, facing no less than ten military campaigns between 1807 and 1833. These confrontations were largely motivated by the Qājār attempt to establish control over Herat’s westernmost town of Ghūriyān and served to confirm the subservience of the

²⁹⁷ McNeill to Palmerston, Tehran, 28 September 1837 (IOL, L/PS/20/A7/1, No. 78, p. 78).

²⁹⁸ Eastwick 1976 II: 248.

²⁹⁹ Note by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in Rajab 1287/November 1870, quoted in Sārli 1995: 162–3. For the causes and effects of the famine, which affected Khurāsān, Iṣfahān, Yazd and Fārs alike, see McDaniel 1971: 40; Melville 1993b; Okazaki 1986.

³⁰⁰ At the time of Bellew’s visit, not even half of the 9,000 houses in Mashhad were tenanted (Bellew 1874: 364). In 1875, Napier reported that 7,500 houses were inhabited in Mashhad. He concluded that the resident population amounted to 30,000 persons. To this he added a fluctuating population of 5,000 to 6,000 pilgrims visiting Mashhad every month (Napier 1875: 221). During his visit in 1883, I’timād al-Saltāna estimated the population of Mashhad at 40,000 persons: “I have not been able to ascertain an exact figure for the population of this city. Most of the people I asked gave exaggerated figures. Some offered the opinion that the inhabitants of this city amounted to 100,000 persons. But to all appearances the actual figure is a lot lower. As far as I can judge, there must be about 40,000 persons. According to the calculation of an Iranian officer the population of the city of Mashhad amounts to 32,000 persons. In any event the religious students and ulama (*tullāb va ahl-i ‘ilm*) form the strongest segment of the city population” (MSh II: 31).

³⁰¹ Morgan 1874.

local Sadūzai rulers. Hovering between 10,000 and 50,000 *tūmān*, the tribute collected at Herat was negligible in comparison with the revenues yielded by the central provinces of 'Irāq, Fārs and Gīlān and probably merely supplemented the cost of dispatching the provincial army. The relatively weak position of the Qājār government in Khurāsān is also reflected by the fact that the entire province submitted no revenues to speak of to Tehran in the early nineteenth century.³⁰² During his third tenure as governor of Khurāsān from 1861–1863, Ḥusām al-Saltāna assessed the entire revenue of Herat at 80,000 *tūmān*, an amount which he considered insufficient for covering the military and administrative expenses required for a steady Iranian presence there.³⁰³

The fact that Herat continued to rate high on the Qājār agenda despite its financial unattractiveness underlines the pull generated by its symbolic value. The Iranian engagement at Herat climaxed with the sustained sieges of 1837–1838 and 1856, which aimed at forcefully incorporating this principality into the Qājār statehood. During the intervening periods, there is a noticeable tension between the tenacity of Qājār ideas of territoriality and the tenuousness of their actual control over Khurāsān. This state of affairs was highlighted by two major rebellions affecting the core regions of the province in 1813–1816 and 1847–1850.

Qājār presence in Khurāsān reached an all-time low in the winter of 1848–49, when the provincial governor Ḥamza Mīrzā was driven out of Mashhad and had to seek refuge with the ruler of Herat. The situation of the army sent from Tehran under the command of Ḥusām al-Saltāna was not much better. The Qājār general and his troops initially depended on the Za'farānlū leadership of Khabūshān for survival and did not regain control of the provincial capital before March 1850. The 1850s, by contrast, witnessed sustained efforts to place Herat, Marv and Sīstān under the umbrella of Qājār control. The Iranian ambitions on Herat were finally throttled by British involvement. The resultant Treaty of Paris sealed the fate of Herat and effectively removed Ghūriyān, so hotly contested in the early nineteenth century, from the scope of Qājār control. The Iranian government also failed to gain a permanent foothold at Marv, and in 1860 the army was beaten decisively by the local Turkmen population.

Thus, we may note two contrary trends in Qājār territorial design. Generous conceptions of political space coincided with a limited scope of military action and a marginal government presence even within the core regions of the historical province. The tension between a historical sense of entitlement and the constricted political circumstances also manifests in the chronicles of the time. In particular, Rizā Qulī Khān Hidāyat's account displays an interesting contrast between the endeavor to create a sense of historical continuity and the changing realities "shining through" in the narrative of the political events. Besides adhering to the stylistic devices typically employed to convey royal splendor, Hidāyat achieves a notion of permanence by appealing to historical precedents. He illustrates the high rank of the founder of the Qājār dynasty by placing him on the same footing with mythical and real heroes like Afrāsiyāb, Chingiz Khān, Amīr Tīmūr and Shāh Ismā'īl I.³⁰⁴ For Fath 'Alī Shāh's campaigns to Khurāsān, Hidāyat adds a specifically Safavid frame of reference by portraying the military activities of 1217/1802 as a continuation of Shāh Ismā'īl I's and Ṭahmāsp I's earlier contentions with the Uzbek leadership.³⁰⁵ He also uses Fath 'Alī Shāh's eastern expedition in 1233/1818 to revive Safavid territorial claims. According to his portrayal, the Qājār king allegedly set out to subject Ṭukhāristān, Gharjistān, Kābul, and Zābul, whereas, in fact, his actual military activities concentrated on Khabūshān and Mashhad.³⁰⁶

³⁰² Fraser 1825: 217–218.

³⁰³ Eastwick 1976 II: 244–5.

³⁰⁴ *Āyandagān īn daftar bikhvānand va īn ma'nī bidānand ki haẓrat-i sikandar rutbat tīmūr 'azīmat Āqā Muḥammad Khān b. Muḥammad Ḥasan Khān b. Fath 'Alī Khān Qājār Qūyunlū az a'āẓim-i salāṭīn-i 'ālam būda dar 'azm u ḥazm va razm u bazm az aqrān-i Afrāsiyāb va Chingiz Khān va Amīr Tīmūr-i Gūrkhān va Shāh Isma'il-i Ṣafavī ast* (TRSN IX: 291–2).

³⁰⁵ *Īn farzandzāda-yi Sulṭān Muḥammad Ḥusain [Ḥasan?] Khān b. Fath 'Alī Khān-i maghfūr [Fath 'Alī Khān Qūyunlū] ki az aulād-i Chingiz va aḥḡād-i Tīmūr [Tīmūr Lang] būd ba-ḥukm-i virāthāt dar mulk-i Khurāsān yūrish-i chingizī va shūrish-i tīmūrī tāza farmūd... chinānki Shāh Isma'il-i Ṣafavī ba-muḥāriba-yi Shībak Khān-i Ūzbak [Muḥammad Khān Shībānī] ravad yā Shāh Ṭahmāsb farzand-i ū ba-mudāfi 'a-yi 'Abdullāh ['Ubaidullāh?] Khān-i Mā varā' al-nahrī hamīshavad* (TRSN IX: 376).

³⁰⁶ *Chūn haẓrat-i khāqān-i akbar va pādshāh-i buzurg az jānib-i Khvārazm va vilāyāt-i Khurāsān āsūda khāṭir nabūd ba-'azm-i razm-i Khvārazm va qaṣḡd-i taskhīr-i Ṭukhāristān u Gharjistān u Kābul u Zābul 'azīmat-i yūrish-i mulūkāna kard* (TRSN IX: 376).

Another characteristic trait of Hidāyat's account are the geographical-historical excursuses conceptualizing Khurāsān and, by extension, Iran, as naturally grown and intimately related units. Reiterating conventional geographical concepts, he revives Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's formulaic description of Khurāsān as consisting of ʿTukhāristān (Balkh), Marv, Nīshāpūr, and Herat. Hidāyat begins his historical overviews of Marv, Sarakhs and Herat by locating the cities in the fourth clime and by linking their foundation to mythical Iranian kings. In this manner, he embeds the ancient metropolises in a timeless, uniquely Iranian space.³⁰⁷ For all his emphasis on a grand, historically grown expanse, Hidāyat also hints at internal division. The narrative typically switches from projections of Khurāsān's perpetuity and unity to the minutiae of ongoing local conflict. The author's emphasis on the *'arabkhāna* and the *kurdkhāna* as the constituent elements of the region highlights tribal dominance and conveys a sense of regional fragmentation.³⁰⁸

The Iranian chronicles of the nineteenth century follow well-established paths of historiography. One marked feature is the description of successive battle scenes, with the citadels constituting dots in the landscape to be joined by conquest, and to be realigned with the map of Qājār power. Again, these descriptions inadvertently reveal the limited scope of military activity in Khurāsān.³⁰⁹ For all their emphasis on the subservient status of the Afghān elite³¹⁰ and Herat's position as an integral component of the *mamālik-i mahrūsa*,³¹¹ the authors outline different spheres of inclusion and clearly distinguish between the core of Qājār Khurāsān centered around Mashhad and the eastern, more peripheral regions. In his description of the events in the winter of 1248/1832–33, Faẓlullāh Shīrāzī identifies Nā'ib al-Saltāna's conquests of Khabūshān, Sarakhs and Turbat-i Ḥaidarīya as pertaining to the "internal matters of Khurāsān", while categorizing activities in Herat and Khvārazm as "foreign affairs".³¹² In connection with the pressure Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān exerted on Herat in 1855, Hidāyat likewise makes a distinction between "inner" Khurāsān and its "outer limits".³¹³ Although Hidāyat labels Herat as part of "eastern" (*mashriqī*, *sharqī*) Khurāsān³¹⁴ and as the "frontiers" (*sarḥaddāt*) of Khurāsān,³¹⁵ he also creates the impression that going there in fact entailed leaving Khurāsān.³¹⁶ While no doubt mirroring the political realities of the time, the perception of Mashhad and Herat as separate entities echoes a long-standing territorial concept. The idea of a bifurcation of Khurāsān, documented since Mongol times and manifest in Safavid administrative arrangements, thus continues to carry weight in nineteenth-century delineations of space.

564). Prior to battling Faṭḥ Khān Muḥammadzai over the possession of Ghūriyān earlier that year, Faṭḥ 'Alī Shāh's son Shujā' al-Saltāna engaged in a verbal confrontation with the Afghān leader. According to Hidāyat, he invoked a precedent from the *Shāhnāma*, threatening to wreak as much havoc in Afghānistān and Kābulistān as the Kayanid king Bahman once did in Zābulistān: *Bā Afghānistān va Kābulistān hamān kunam ki Bahman bā Zābulistān kard* (TRSN IX: 561).

³⁰⁷ TRSN IX: 276; X: 218, 479, 540–2.

³⁰⁸ TRSN X: 328.

³⁰⁹ A fine example of this sort of mapping is furnished by Hidāyat's minute description of the local forts successively conquered by Ḥusām al-Saltāna in the spring of 1849 (TRSN X: 377–80).

³¹⁰ See, for instance, *Ashraf al-tavārīkh* 405.

³¹¹ See, for instance, TRSN X: 543.

³¹² *Az qarār-i farmāyish-i shāhanshāh-i tājdār navvāb-i valī' ahd-i kāmkār-ra manẓūr-i nāẓar īn būd ki ba'd az tamshiyat-i umūrāt-i dākhilī-yi mamlakat-i Khurāsān ba-anjām-i mahāmm-i khārijī az qabil-i kār-i Khvārazm va Harāt, panja-yi dilīrī gushāyad va ba har tariq ki mumkin āyad farmān-ravāyān u ḥukkām u ahālī-yi ān ṣafaḥāt-rā muṭī' va munqād namāyad* (*Dhū al-qarnain* 836). In connection with Ḥasan Khān Sālār's rebellion, Lisān al-Mulk even describes Kāl-i Yāqūtī near Mashhad as the "frontier" (*ḥudūd*) of Khurāsān (NT 972–3; see also NT 296, 975, 1123). Discussing the events of 1857, he characterizes the village of Rāz in the Kopet Dag mountains as located "on the border of the country [of Iran]" (*Qarya-yi Rāz ki dar sarḥadd-i mamlakat ast*) (NT 1373). For the year 1299/1881–82, I'timād al-Saltāna speaks of Kalāt and Sarakhs as constituting the "borders" (*sarḥaddāt*) of Khurāsān (TMN 2036, 2039).

³¹³ *Az īn jisārat-i khisārat-angīz va jalādat-i fitna-āmīz-i ū [Amīr Dūst Muḥammad Khān] dūr nabāshad ki rishta-yi intizām-i sarḥaddāt-i khārija-yi Khurāsān gusikhta gardad va harj u marj-i tamām dar bilād-i dākhila-yi Khurāsān rūy kunad* (TRSN X: 671).

³¹⁴ TRSN X: 652, 670–5.

³¹⁵ TRSN X: 704.

³¹⁶ See, for instance, Ḥamza Mīrzā's departure for Herat in the winter of 1265/1848–49 (TRSN X: 373; 385).

The territorial designations employed by the Persian historiographers may also be read as an early figure of the political framework to take shape later in the century. As mapped by Hidāyat and his colleagues, the limits of Khurāsān become tangible in the vicinity of the provincial capital and anticipate the boundaries that eventually came into being in the 1880s. While Mashhad served as the mainstay of the Qājār administration of Khurāsān, it figures as a distant eastern outpost in the historical narrative. Hidāyat reinforces this impression by depicting Khurāsān as the frontier with Central Asia and describing the rulers of Khīva as active agents in the region. In his portrayal, the rebellion of 1847–1850 owed its initial success to Ḥasan Khān Sālār's close relationship with the Khān of Khīva, as well as with the Turkmens of Sarakhs, Akhal, Tejend, Qarayāb, and Khīva.³¹⁷ In the following chapter, I will explore the developments in the debated spaces beyond the northeastern and southeastern rim of Khurāsān proper. Again, the focus will be on the process whereby the vagueness of Qājār territorial conceptions increasingly gave way to a sense of containment, as the new borders successively gained shape and instilled a sense of permanence. As will be seen below, the physical delimitation of the Iranian sphere of interest generated a new sense of entitlement and the opportunity to consolidate government claims over regions formerly merely loosely incorporated into the kingdom.

³¹⁷ TRSN X: 393–4.